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Abstract: We study the selection and dynamics of two popular pricing policies xed price
and exible price in competitive markets. Our paper extends previous work in marketing,
e.g. Desai and Purohit (2004) by focusing on decentralized markets with a dynamic and fully
competitive framework while also considering possible non-economic aspects of bargaining. We
construct and analyze a competitive search model which allows us to endogenize the expected
demand depending on pricing rules and posted prices. Our analysis reveals that xed and exible
pricing policies generally coexist in the same marketplace, and each policy comes with its own
list price and customer demographics. More specically, if customers dislike haggling, then xed
pricing emerges as the unique equilibrium, but if customers get some additional satisfaction from
the bargaining process, then both policies are o¤ered, and the unique equilibrium exhibits full
segmentation: Haggler customers avoid xed-price rms and exclusively shop at exible rms
whereas non-haggler customers do the opposite. We also nd that prices increase in customer
satisfaction, implying that sellers take advantage of the positive utility enjoyed by hagglers in
the form of higher prices. Finally, considering the presence of seasonal cycles in most markets,
we analyze a scenario where market demand goes through periodic ups and downs and nd that
equilibrium prices remain mostly stable despite signicant uctuations in demand. This nding
suggests a plausible competition-based explanation for the stability of prices.
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1 Introduction
In a variety of markets, including houses, used cars, boats or jewelry, xed and exible pricing
policies often coexist. While some sellers clearly indicate that they are exible and open to bar-
gaining (e.g., a homeowner putting OBO(or best o¤er) next to the asking price), other sellers
point out xed-prices by using words such as sharp price or no-negotiations. Some popular
used car supermarkets in the UK, such as Cargiant, o¤er only xed prices and leave no room for
negotiation, whereas it is still a common practice to negotiate in most other used-car dealerships.
Similarly, many sellers who are well-known for xed-price selling are reported to allow haggling in
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recent years (Richtel, 2008; Agins and Collins, 2001). Some even go one step further and train their
employees in the art of bargaining with customers (Stout, 2013). In addition, consumers vary in
their bargaining ability and practice in purchasing such items. According to Consumer Reports
recent national survey of American adults on their haggling habits, while a notable portion of indi-
viduals report negotiating when they purchased appliances (39%), jewelry (32%), furniture (43%),
and collectibles and antiques (48%), with 89% of those who haggled obtained discounts at least
once, others simply have not tried bargaining at all (Marks, 2013).
Although the practice of both xed price and exible price policies are widespread, there are
surprisingly few studies in the marketing literature that investigate strategic drivers and implica-
tions of these seemingly contrasting pricing policies (see Desai and Purohit (2004) for an exception).
Our goal in this paper is to understand the dynamics and consequences of xed and exible pric-
ing policies in fully competitive settings. We particularly focus on decentralized markets such as
housing, used cars, boats, or high-end jewelry which exhibit the following characteristics. First,
the majority of these markets operate via search and matching: it takes time and e¤ort to locate
an item or to attract a buyer and depending on the market, a player may have to wait days or
even weeks before he buys or sells. Second, sellers typically have limited inventories (which is the
case in markets for houses, apartments, used cars or boats, where sellers usually possess a single
item, and to a certain extent it is the case in markets for home furniture, jewelry, or antiques);
consequently, there may be signicant trade frictions in that a product available today may not be
available tomorrow. Third, a large number of independent sellers compete with each other in order
to attract customers, and in doing so, they use a range of pricing tools and tactics in an e¤ort to
appeal to customers.
As hinted above, these characteristics are present in a notable proportion of markets for big
ticket items. In addition, markets for other products that may not necessarily be considered as
big-ticket e.g. used product markets for electronics, playstations or bicycles, also broadly exhibit
the aforementioned characteristics, and therefore are relevant to our study context. In contrast, not
all big ticket items demonstrate all the aforementioned traits. For example, markets for some new
large appliances such as high-end big screen TVs often exhibit ample product availability, which
renders our model less suitable for those settings.
A key feature of the markets we study is that bargaining is arguably as prevalent as xed pricing,
especially if conceivable savings from bargaining are not negligible for customers. Customers,
however, are not homogenous in their ability and willingness to negotiate in that some customers
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are willing to exert e¤ort to obtain a discount (hagglers), whereas others are not (non-hagglers).
As such, sellerspricing policies (xed or exible) may have signicant consequences in terms of
the kind of customers they attract or dispel. Also, the process of bargaining may involve additional
psychological dynamics for customers. Specically, haggling may be discomforting and costly due
to additional e¤ort or opportunity cost of time, or due to concerns of being perceived as cheap or
unclassy (Evans and Beltramini, 1987; Pruitt, 2013). On the other hand, in addition to tangible
benets of obtaining a lower price, customers may also get secondary non-economic benets from
the bargaining process such as feelings of enjoyment or excitement.
Our modeling approach is based on a competitive search (directed search) framework which
takes into account the aforementioned characteristics that is, we consider a decentralized market
with search frictions where sellers have limited product availability and customers may enjoy or
dislike bargaining. Extending existing work in marketing on xed and exible pricing policies (i.e.,
Desai and Purohit, 2004), our directed search approach allows us to explicitly incorporate full
market competition in a decentralized and dynamic setup, which we believe is the rst study doing
so in the marketing literature.
The model provides several important insights. First, in our benchmark case where customers
are neutral to the bargaining process (i.e. they receive no displeasure or enjoyment from the process
itself), we show that a continuum of search equilibria exist, and in any realized equilibrium, partial
segmentation of customers takes place. Specically, non-haggler customers self-select themselves
into xed-price rms, whereas haggler customers are indi¤erent and may shop anywhere. This
is because exible rms foresee an eventual surplus loss during negotiations, so they strategically
inate the list price. Such inated prices, however, put o¤ non-haggler customers as they cannot
negotiate better deals. Thus, the exible rms end up attracting haggler customers only. Fixed
price rms, on the other hand, announce moderate prices and attract both types of customers.
Second, if customers dislike haggling, then xed pricing emerges as the unique equilibrium. This
is because buyers incur some disutility due to haggling, which, in a competitive setting bleeds into
exible sellersprot functions, and causes them to earn less. As a result, sellers are better o¤ with
xed pricing.
Third, we nd that if customers get some additional pleasure (proxied by a positive ") from
the haggling process, then a unique equilibrium emerges with full segmentation of customers where
hagglers avoid xed-price rms and non-hagglers avoid exible rms. In addition, we show that
the equilibrium list prices increase in "; implying that sellers take advantage of the positive utility
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enjoyed by hagglers in the form of higher prices. Surprisingly, we observe a spillover e¤ect in that
xed price sellers, who do not cater to haggler customers also raise their prices if " goes up.
Finally, taking into account the fact that most markets follow seasonal trends (Radas and
Shugan, 1998), we consider the price dynamics in a long selling period where demand goes through
seasonal ups and downs. An interesting nding is that prices do not uctuate as much as the
demand. This observation provides an interesting insight. In explaining the stability of prices, a
signicant portion of existing literature in marketing highlights price fairness concerns (Xia et al.,
2004; Bolton et al., 2003; Anderson and Simester, 2008) which has its origins in the principle of dual
entitlement put forward by Kahneman et al. (1986). Our model, on the other hand, provides an
additional explanation for price stability that is based on forward looking customers in a competitive
and dynamic market.
2 Model
2.1 Description of the Model
Consider a dynamic market that runs for t = 1; 2; :::; T periods and is populated by a continuum
of heterogeneous buyers and homogeneous sellers. Each seller has one unit of a product that he
is willing to sell above his reservation price, zero, and each buyer wants to purchase one unit and
is willing to pay up to his reservation price, one. Buyers are divided into two groups according to
their bargaining abilities. Low types (non-hagglers) are not skilled in bargaining and never attempt
to negotiate the list price. High types (hagglers) on the other hand are skilled in bargaining and
negotiate the price whenever it is worthwhile to do so. (In the Online Appendix 2 we extend the
model by considering N types.)
The market is decentralized and operates via competitive search. At the beginning of each
period sellers simultaneously and independently announce a list price rm;t 2 [0; 1] and a declaration
m 2 frm (f); best o¤er (b)g indicating whether they are rm with the price or whether they are
exible to accept a counter o¤er. If the seller is rm then the transaction takes place at the list
price. If he is exible then the transaction may involve bargaining, but if the buyer does not wish
to bargain or if two or more buyers are present at the rm then no bargaining takes place and
the item is sold at the initially posted price (more on this below). Before proceeding further, we
should acknowledge that our model implicitly assumes that sellers can commit to a pricing rule and
implement it without incurring any costs. However, in reality sellers may nd it di¢ cult to commit
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to a xed price policy, for instance, in markets where bargaining is prevalent and customers insist
upon receiving a deal.
Buyers observe sellers announcements and then choose to visit a seller. It is possible that
multiple customers show up at the same location, so we let n = 0; 1; 2; : : : denote the realized
demand. If n  2 then each buyer has an equal chance 1=n of being selected. If transaction
occurs at price pt then the seller obtains t 1pt and the buyer obtains t 1 (1  pt) ; where  is the
common discount factor.
The decentralized nature of the market, coupled with sellerslimited inventories, creates trade
frictions in that no one is guaranteed of an immediate trade and players may have to try for several
periods before they can actually buy or sell. Indeed, if multiple customers show up at the same
rm, then some of them walk out empty-handed because of the limited inventory. Similarly, due
to the decentralized matching process a seller may well end up with no customer at all. In either
case players need to wait for the subsequent period to try again. Waiting, of course, is costly as
future payo¤s are discounted at rate :1
The market starts with a measure of s1 sellers and b1 buyers, of which a fraction 1 2 (0; 1) are
low types. At the end of each period, players who transact exit the market while the remaining
ones move to the next period to play the same game. Outgoing players may be fully or partially
replaced. Specically, we assume that at the beginning of each period t = 2; 3::: a new cohort of
bnewt buyers and s
new
t sellers enter the market joining the existing players. The measures of buyers
and sellers present in the market at time t, denoted by bt and st; depend on the entering cohorts
as well as the existing players who are yet to trade. (In Section 6 we discuss how bt and st evolve
over time.)
Finally, our model considers possible additional psychological utility (or disutility) associated
with the bargaining experience. In order to examine such non-economic considerations, we introduce
a parameter, "; which can be positive, negative or zero depending on how customers perceive the
bargaining experience and we explore how this parameter a¤ects the selection of equilibrium pricing
rules. The parameter " enters into a buyers utility function as an additive separable term, which
captures the idea that in addition to and independent of the utility derived from the consumption
of the good (proxied by the price of the item), customers derive some additional utility or disutility
from bargaining. This is also consistent with the previous literature in which consumersbargaining
1 In the Online Appendix 2 we explore a variation where unmatched buyers and sellers get to meet for a second
time during the same trading period and show that the results remain robust, upto a modication in outside options.
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cost is incorporated in additive separable form (Rubinstein, 1982; Desai and Purohit, 2004). Finally,
the parameter " is relevant for haggler customers only. It is inapplicable for non-hagglers, as they
always pay the list price due to their lack of bargaining skills.
2.2 Discussion of the Modeling Approach
A number of models in marketing and pricing literatures examine strategic implications of di¤erent
pricing policies, however, most of these studies do not consider competition, and instead focus
on a monopolist seller who receives customers exogenously (Riley and Zeckhauser, 1983; Wang,
1995; Kuo et al., 2011, 2013).2 Other studies incorporate competition using Hotelling or Cournot
frameworks.3 In a closer work to ours, Desai and Purohit (2004) consider a duopoly setting and
use a Hotelling framework to examine the implications of haggling and xed price policy decisions
by two retailers. They show that depending on the parameters, there may exist equilibria in
which both rms choose xed prices, both rms o¤er haggling, or where one rm o¤ers haggling
and the other charges xed prices. An important nding of theirs is that the benets of price
discrimination in a monopoly setting do not necessarily transfer over to a competitive environment.
The Hotelling framework captures competition between (typically two) major retailers without
inventory constraints in an e¤ective way, however our study, which focuses on competition between
a large number of sellers, who have limited inventories and who operate in a market with trade
frictions calls for a di¤erent modeling approach. To that end, our directed search approach is
a natural t in capturing the aforementioned market characteristics and modelling them in an
analytically tractable way.
Our model also di¤ers from the existing directed search models (Eeckhout and Kircher, 2010;
Virag, 2011) with several new features. First, we explicitly incorporate customer heterogeneity
in terms of bargaining skills (hagglers vs. non-hagglers). Second, we introduce a dynamic setup
which enables us to examine strategic implications of xed and exible pricing policies over multiple
2Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) examine a monopolist seller facing risk neutral customers, and suggest that xed
pricing is optimal in comparison to negotiations. This is because while haggling may be advantageous in terms of
price discrimination, the gains from haggling are more than o¤set when buyers refuse purchasing at higher prices.
Wang (1995) creates a dynamic model with a monopolist seller, and concludes that bargaining is preferable if it costs
the same as xed pricing, or if the common costs are high enough. Focusing on operations-related questions in a
monopoly setting, Kuo et al. (2011) characterize the optimal posted price and the resulting negotiation outcome as
a function of inventory and time, and Kuo et al. (2013) focus on pricing policy in a supply chain.
3For instance, Wernerfelt (1994) nds that in a duopoly bargaining may be prot maximizing for sellers as it
helps them avoid the costly Bertrand competition. Using a Hotelling framework, Gill and Thanassoulis (2016) study
strategically chosen stochastic discounts in markets with prior list-price-setting competition. Kuksov (2004) considers
a duopoly model of competition with search costs, and demonstrates that lower search costs may actually result in
higher prices since product di¤erentiation can also increase with decreased search costs.
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periods and in seasonal markets.
As mentioned earlier, our model considers possible non-economic utility (or disutility) associated
with the bargaining experience, proxied by the parameter ". A negative value for " indicates
disutility associated with haggling, which has been highlighted in a number of studies as buyers
bargaining disutility (Morton et al., 2011) or haggling costs (Desai and Purohit, 2004). A negative
" suggests that customers may have the ability to bargain down the list price, but nevertheless,
they may dislike the bargaining process, say, for the fear of being seen as cheap or unclassy, or due
to opportunity cost of time.
A positive " on the other hand, refers to possible non-economic factors such as additional excite-
ment, enjoyment or thrill from the bargaining experience. We must admit, however, that a positive
" does not have a very clear justication, which is a major limitation for the following reasons.
First, the benet or enjoyment of bargaining could be rst and foremost due to the tangible benet
of getting a lower price. While there may exist additional psychological benets of bargaining4
beyond obtaining a lower price, these are likely to be of secondary order for customers. Second,
in our model we treat the positive " as an exogenous parameter, without explicitly accounting for
factors, psychological or otherwise, that may give rise to it. If such factors are explicitly included in
the model, then they may have important interactions with other components of the model, which
we do not consider here. In sum, while our ndings with the positive " are intriguing, one should
take note of these caveats in interpreting the corresponding results.
2.3 Bargaining and the Sale Price
We move backwards in the analysis, starting with the determination of the bargained price in a
meeting. We, then, turn to buyerssearch decisions and explain how the expected demand at each
rm is pinned down. Finally, we turn to the sellersproblem and explore how they select prices
and pricing rules.
The list price at a exible rm may be negotiated if the rm has a single customer. If two
or more customers are present then no bargaining takes place and the item is sold at the posted
price.5 Let  denote the bargaining power of high type buyers relative to the seller. The bargaining
4Bargaining process may possibly provide additional excitement and sensory involvement (Babin et al., 1994), as
well as an additional satisfaction by feeling victorious, proud and smart from obtaining a deal (Holbrook et al., 1984;
Schindler, 1998; Jones et al., 1997). These feelings for bargaining may "transcend the satisfaction of mere economic
gain" (Sherry, 1990)
5The assumption that haggling is possible only if there is a single customer in store (n = 1) is without loss in
generality. One can recast the model where haggling may be possible for n > 1; however this modication does not
add any additional insight.
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power of low types is normalized to zero. Similarly, let uh;t+1 and t+1 denote, respectively, a high
type buyers and a sellers expected payo¤ ("value of search") in period t+ 1: These payo¤s serve
as outside options during negotiations, i.e. in case of disagreement the buyer walks out with payo¤
uh;t+1 and the seller with t+1. The negotiated price, yt, can be found as the solution to the
following maximization problem:
max
yt2[0;1]
(1  yt + "  uh;t+1) (yt   t+1)1  :
The solution yields
yt = 1  uh;t+1    (1  uh;t+1   t+1) + " (1  ) : (1)
The bargained price yt falls with ; i.e. the higher the buyers negotiation skills, the lower the price.
To see why, note that uh;t+1+t+1  1 because the total payo¤ in a transaction cannot exceed the
maximum surplus, one. Therefore the expression 1   (uh;t+1 + t+1) is positive; hence yt falls in
. In addition yt rises with t+1 and falls with uh;t+1 i.e. the stronger the sellers outside option
the higher the price and the stronger the buyers outside option the lower the price. As it turns
out, outside options depend on how competitive the market is expected to be in the next period,
in the period after, and so on. Even though bargaining is bilateral and takes place between two
players in private, it is still driven by market competition, which lters into the negotiation process
via outside options.
Whether or not buyers attempt to renegotiate depends on how yt compares with the list price
rb;t as well as the parameter ": The case " = 0 is straightforward: buyers opt for bargaining if they
can negotiate a better deal than the list price, i.e. if yt  rb;t: If, however, " < 0 then buyers
attempt to renegotiate only if the deal they end up getting warrants incurring the negative ", i.e.
if yt  rb;t + ". We assume that buyersbargaining power is su¢ ciently large to ensure that, even
after accounting for the negative "; they would still prefer bargaining over purchasing at the posted
price. (The other scenario where they would not even attempt negotiating trivially yields a xed
price equilibrium.) Finally, if " > 0 then buyers opt for bargaining if yt  rb;t: The parameter "
is absent from this condition because the psychological satisfaction from bargaining (proxied by a
positive ") kicks in only if the item is purchased below the list price.
These conditions require the bargaining power  to be su¢ ciently high, which we assume to
be the case for now. (Subsequently we will provide the necessary thresholds.) The opposite case
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where even high types are unable to negotiate a better deal is trivial as the availability of bargaining
becomes immaterial and the model collapses to a xed price setting.
2.4 Buyers Problem
Demand Distribution. In the tradition of the competitive search literature we focus on visit-
ing strategies that are symmetric and anonymous (Burdett et al., 2001; Shimer, 2005; Eeckhout
and Kircher, 2010). Symmetry requires buyers of the same type use the same visiting strategies.
Anonymity, on the other hand, means that visiting strategies ought to depend on what sellers post
but not on sellersidentities i.e. sellers posting the same list price rm;t and trading with the same
pricing rule m ought to be visited with the same probability.6
Given symmetry and anonymity, the number of applications at a rm follows a Poisson dis-
tribution. To see why, and to get some intuition on how the matching process works, consider a
nite setting with B buyers and S sellers, where the buyer seller ratio equals to  = B=S. For a
moment ignore the haggler-price taker distinction and suppose that all buyers are price takers. Also
suppose that all sellers use xed pricing and post the same list price, say, r = 0:5. Since all sellers
compete with the same rule and post the same price, symmetry and anonymity in buyersvisiting
strategies imply that the probability that a buyer visits a particular seller is 1=S: Consequently,
the probability that the seller gets n customers equals to
Pr [n] =

B
n

(1=S)n (1  1=S)B n ;
i.e. the seller receives customers according to a binomial distribution with parameters B and 1=S:
The expected number of customers, therefore, equals to B  1=S = : Now x  and let B and S
tend to innity (recall that we have a continuum of buyers and sellers). As the market gets large,
the binomial distribution converges to the Poisson distribution with arrival rate , that is
Pr [n] =
e n
n!
:
6 Imposing symmetry and anonymity on visiting strategies is a restriction; however these assumptions facilitate the
characterization of the equilibrium and lead to outcomes which are analytically tractable. As such, with few exceptions
the vast majority of the directed search literature restricts attention to such strategies. A notable exception is an
extension in Burdett et al. (2001) where they consider a simple 2 by 2 setup with only two buyers and two sellers
and construct equilibria supported by non symmetric strategies; however such equilibria require coordination among
buyers on who goes where. In a small market with few buyers such coordination may be possible, but in a large
market with multiple buyers and sellers such coordination is not feasible. The symmetric equilibrium requires no
coordination.
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Along this example every rm competes with xed pricing and posts the same list price, and
therefore, the expected demand at each rm equals to : (Even though the ex-ante expected
demand at each rm is , the ex-post realized demand is uncertain. A rm may well end up
getting no customer at all, or it may get more customers than it can serve.) If sellers were to post
di¤erent prices, or pick di¤erent pricing rules, then, again because of symmetry and anonymity, the
demand distribution at each rm would be still Poisson, but each with a di¤erent arrival rate that
depends on what the seller posts and how it compares with the rest of the market (Galenianos and
Kircher, 2012). For instance, if a seller posts a lower price, say 0:4; while everyone else still posts
0:5, then his expected demand q would be higher than  (more on this below).
In the full-edged model the expected demand q depends not only on the list price r; but also
on the pricing rule m; the date t and buyerstype i: Specically, the probability that a rm with
the terms (rm;t;m) meets n = 0; 1; 2::: customers of type i = h; l is given by
Pr [n] =
e qi;m;t(rm;t)qni;m;t (rm;t)
n!
 zn (qi;m;t) . (2)
The fact that q is indexed by i indicates that, when thinking about the total demand at a rm,
one has to consider arrivals from high types qh;m;t as well as low types ql;m;t:
Firms post their prices and pricing rules, and buyers direct their search depending on how
attractive these terms are. All else equal, cheaper rms attract more customers and expensive
rms attract fewer customers; however price is not the only concern for a buyer when deciding
where to shop. Each seller has a limited inventory, so buyers must also take into account the
likelihood of not being able to purchase today and having to try again in the next period. In that
respect it is easier to purchase at expensive rms as they tend to be less crowded; thus, customers
do not necessarily head straight to the cheapest rm. In equilibrium, the expected demands adjust
to ensure that buyers are indi¤erent across all rms posting di¤erent prices or pricing rules.7
Expected Utilities. Let Ui;m;t denote a type i = h; l buyers expected utility at a rm trading
with rule m 2 ff; bg: Consider a xed price rm with price rf;t. We have
Ui;f;t =
P1
n=0
zn(qh;f;t+ql;f;t)
n+1 (1  rf;t) +

1 P1n=0 zn(qh;f;t+ql;f;t)n+1 ui;t+1: (3)
High types and low types arrive at Poisson rates qh;f;t and ql;f;t: The distribution of the total
7Throughout the text we use "expected demand", "arrival rate" and "queue length" interchangeably.
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demand, therefore, is also Poisson with arrival rate qh;f;t + ql;f;t: So, a buyer who nds himself
at the rm nds n = 0; 1; : : : other buyers with probability zn (qh;f;t + ql;f;t). He purchases with
probability 1=(n+ 1) and his payo¤ is 1  rf;t. With the complementary probability, given by the
expression in square brackets, the buyer fails to transact so he moves to the next period, where he
expects to earn ui;t+1:
Now consider a exible rm with list price rb;t. A low type buyer always pays the list price rb;t;
so, his expected utility Ul;b;t is similar to above:
Ul;b;t =
P1
n=0
zn(qh;b;t+ql;b;t)
n+1 (1  rb;t) +

1 P1n=0 zn(qh;b;t+ql;b;t)n+1 ul;t+1: (4)
A high types expected utility Uh;b;t, on the other hand, is given by
Uh;b;t = z0 (qh;b;t + ql;b;t) (1 + "  yt) +
P1
n=1
zn(qh;b;t+ql;b;t)
n+1 (1  rb;t)
+

1 P1n=0 zn(qh;b;t+ql;b;t)n+1 uh;t+1: (5)
With probability z0 (qh;b;t + ql;b;t) the high type buyer is alone at the rm, in which case he bargains
and obtains the item paying yt: Since the transaction involves bargaining, the buyer obtains the
additional ". The second part of the expression is similar to above: with probability zn (qh;b;t + ql;b;t)
he nds n = 1; 2 : : : competitors; so he purchases with probability 1=(n + 1) paying the list price
rb;t (recall that if multiple customers are present then no bargaining takes place). Finally with the
complementary probability he fails to transact and moves to period t+1, where he expects to earn
uh;t+1:
Lemma 1 We have @Ui;m;t=@rm;t < 0 and @Ui;m;t=@qi;m;t < 0, where i = h; l and m = f; b:
The proof is skipped as it is based on straightforward algebra. Put simply, the Lemma says
buyers dislike expensive or crowded rms (the ones with a high price r or high demand q). The
rst claim is self-explanatory; the second claim follows from the fact that customers are less likely
to purchase at crowded rms.
Let Ui;t denote the maximum expected utility ("market utility") a type i customer can obtain
in the market at time t. For now we treat Ui;t as given, subsequently it will be determined endoge-
nously.8 So, consider an individual seller who advertises the price package (rm;t;m) and suppose
8The market utility approach is standard in the directed search literature as it greatly facilitates the characteriza-
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high and low type buyers respond to this advertisement with arrival rates qh;m;t  0 and ql;m;t  0:
The rates satisfy
qi;m;t > 0 if Ui;m;t (rm;t; qh;m;t; ql;m;t) = Ui;t else qi;m;t = 0: (6)
The indi¤erence condition (6) says that the price package and the arrival rates must generate an
expected utility of at least Uh;t for high type customers, else they will stay away (qh;m;t = 0) and
at least Ul;t for low type customers, else they will stay away (ql;m;t = 0):
The indi¤erence condition also reveals a law of demand in that the expected demand qi;m;t
decreases as the list price rm;t increases. In words, cheaper rms attract more customers and
expensive rms attract fewer customers. To see why, apply the Implicit Function Theorem to
(6) to obtain
dqi;m;t
drm;t
=   @Ui;m;t=@rm;t
@Ui;m;t=@qi;m;t
:
The numerator and the denominator are both negative (Lemma 1); hence dqi;m;t=drm;t is negative,
indicating that if the seller raises r then buyers respond by decreasing q. From a sellers point of
view, raising the price brings in more revenue; however it lowers the expected demand. The sellers
problem involves nding a balance between these two opposing e¤ects, which we study next.
2.5 Sellers Problem and Denition of Equilibrium
The expected prot of a xed price seller is given by
f;t = [1  z0 (qh;f;t + ql;f;t)] rf;t + z0 (qh;f;t + ql;f;t)t+1: (7)
The expression in square brackets is the probability of getting at least a customer, in which case the
item is sold at list price rf;t: With the complementary probability the seller fails to get a customer
and moves to the next period where he expects to earn t+1; which represents his discounted value
of search in period t+ 1: The expected prot of a exible seller is similar:
b;t = z0 (ql;b;t) z1 (qh;b;t) yt + [z0 (qh;b;t) z1 (ql;b;t) +
P1
n=2 zn (ql;b;t + qh;b;t)] rb;t
+z0 (ql;b;t + qh;b;t)t+1:
(8)
tion of equilibrium, e.g. see Burdett et al. (2001). Galenianos and Kircher (2012) provide game theoretic foundations
for the use of the market utility paradigm in a variety of directed search setups.
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With probability z0 (ql;b;t) z1 (qh;b;t) the seller gets a single high type customer, who haggles and
obtains the item at price yt: The expression in square brackets is the probability of getting either a
single low type customer or getting multiple customers. In either case list price rb;t is charged. The
last bit, as above, deals with the possibility of not getting any customer at all. A sellers objective
is to maximize the prot subject to the fact that he must provide buyers with their market utilities.
Specically each seller solves
max
m2ff;bg;rm;t2[0;1];(qh;m;t;ql;m;t)2R2+
m;t subject to (6). (9)
Indi¤erence constraints in (6) determine expected demands qh;m;t and ql;m;t as functions of the
pricing rule m and the list price rm;t. Note that the seller faces two indi¤erence constraints, one
for high type customers and one for low type customers. If both constraints bind, then the seller is
able to attract both types of customers. If a single constraint binds then he attracts one type only.
(The case where neither constraint binds, of course, can be ruled out as it implies that the seller
gets no customer at all.)
Sellers are free to post any price and they are also free to be xed or exible with what they
post. Letting m;t (rm;t) denote the fraction of sellers posting rm;t we have
m;t(rm;t) > 0 only if m;t(rm;t; qh;m;t; ql;m;t) = m;t else m;t (rm;t) = 0; (10)
where
m;t  max
r0m;t2[0;1];(q0h;m;t;q0l;m;t)2R2+
m;t(r
0
m;t; q
0
h;m;t; q
0
l;m;t):
Similarly letting 'm;t denote the fraction of sellers opting for rule m; we have
'm;t > 0 only if m;t = max
~m2ff;bg
 ~m;t; else 'm;t = 0; (11)
i.e. rule m is selected only if it delivers the highest expected prot. This does not mean that a
unique pricing rule will prevail in equilibrium. It is possible that, and indeed it is the case that,
both rules emerge in equilibrium delivering equal prots.
Finally, to close down the model, we need two feasibility conditions to ensure that the weighted
sum of expected demands (per seller) consisting of type i buyers equals to the market wide buyer-
seller ratio for that particular type. Recall that t is the total buyer-seller ratio in period t and
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that t is the fraction of low type buyers. Letting l;t  tt and h;t  (1  t)t we have
'b;t
Z 1
0
b;t(rb;t)qi;b;t(rb;t)drb;t + 'f;t
Z 1
0
f;t(rf;t)qi;f;t(rf;t)drf;t = i;t for i = h; l: (12)
There are two equations in (12), one for high types and one for low types, and the equations are
designed to take into account the possibility of each seller posting a di¤erent price. In Lemma 2,
however, we prove that sellers competing with the same rule m end up posting the same list price
rm;t; so, borrowing that result, and noting that 'f;t + 'b;t = 1; the equations in (12) become
'f;tqi;f;t + (1  'f;t)qi;b;t = i;t for i = h; l: (13)
We can now dene the equilibrium.
Denition 1 A competitive search equilibrium ("equilibrium") consists of prices rm;t; expected
demands qh;m;t; q

l;m;t and fractions 

m;t; '

m;t satisfying the demand distribution (2), buyers
indi¤erence (6), prot maximization (9), equal prots (10)-(11) and feasibility (12).
The evolution of the buyer seller ratio t and the fraction of non-hagglers t, also part of the
equilibrium, is discussed in Section 6.
3 Characterization of Equilibria: The Benchmark Case
The parameter " plays an important role in determining the nature of the equilibria. We start with
the case where " = 0; i.e. where customers are neutral to the bargaining process, i.e. they have no
displeasure or enjoyment from the bargaining process itself.
Proposition 1 Suppose " = 0: Depending on how large  is, the model exhibits two types of
equilibria:
 Partial Segmentation Equilibrium (Eq-PS): If   t  z1 (t) = [1  z0 (t)] then there
exists a continuum of payo¤-equivalent equilibria, where an indeterminate fraction 'f;t  t of
rms trade via xed pricing and remaining rms trade via exible pricing. Fixed and exible
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rms post
rf;t = 1  ut+1  
z1 (t)
1  z0 (t) (1  ut+1   t+1) and (14)
rb;t = 1  ut+1  
z1 (t) (1  )
1  z0 (t)  z1 (t) (1  ut+1   t+1) ; (15)
and if negotiations ensue the transaction occurs at price
yt = 1  ut+1    (1  ut+1   t+1) : (16)
Prices satisfy rb;t > r

f;t > yt; i.e. exible rms post a higher price than what xed price rms
post, which in turn, is greater than the bargained price. The inequality in prices leads to a
partial segmentation in customer demographics: non-hagglers shop exclusively at xed price
rms whereas hagglers shop anywhere. In any equilibrium sellers and buyers earn
t = 1  ut+1   [z0 (t) + z1 (t)] (1  ut+1   t+1) ; (17)
ut = z0 (t) [1  ut+1   t+1] + ut+1 (18)
 Fixed Price Equilibrium (Eq-FP): If  < t, i.e. if high type buyers are not skilled
enough in negotiations, then the availability of bargaining becomes immaterial and xed pricing
emerges as the unique equilibrium, i.e. all sellers adopt xed pricing and post rf;t; given by
(14). Equilibrium payo¤s are the same as above, i.e. sellers and buyers earn t and ut:
The main message of the Proposition is that xed and exible pricing rules can coexist in the
same marketplace; however each rule comes with its own list price and customer demographics.
Flexible rms announce higher prices and attract high types only. Fixed price rms, on the other
hand, announce lower prices and attract both types of customers.
To see why prices are unequal, note that exible stores factor in the fact that they may end
up selling at a discount, so they raise their prices to cover themselves against this contingency.
In other words, they strategically inate the sticker price anticipating the eventual surplus loss
during negotiations. Fixed price rms, on the other hand, are committed to charge what they post,
so they post moderate prices. While the relationship between exible pricing and inated sticker
prices may sound intuitive, to our knowledge, this is the rst study providing a competition based
explanation to such phenomenon with a decentralized market equilibrium approach.
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The inequality of prices raises the question of whether buyers or sellers may want to pass a
potential trading opportunity in the hope of getting a better deal in subsequent periods, and the
answer is no. In the proof of the Proposition we show that players in a match are better o¤
transacting immediately instead of walking away. There are two reasons for this. First, waiting is
costly (the discount factor is less than one), so players have a strong incentive to settle a deal as
early as possible. And more importantly, second, the market operates via search and matching,
so no-one is guaranteed to nd a suitable match in subsequent periods. A seller may not get a
customer at all, whereas a buyer may well end up in a crowded rm and walk out empty handed
as a result. Therefore, a sure transaction today, even under the worst case scenario buying at the
highest price rb;t for a buyer, selling at the lowest price y

t for a seller is still better than walking
away and facing the prospect of not being able to buy or sell tomorrow.
4 Characterization of Equilibria when Customers Dislike Bargain-
ing
The discussion so far revolved around the case " = 0: If, on the other hand, customers dislike the
bargaining experience then the result is remarkably simple.
Proposition 2 If " < 0 then xed pricing emerges as the unique equilibrium. For characterization
see item Eq-FP in Proposition 1.
Recall that if " = 0 then xed and exible pricing are payo¤ equivalent in equilibrium and
sellers are indi¤erent to select either pricing rule. If " falls below zero then this indi¤erence no
longer holds because the negative " lters into exible sellersprots causing them to earn less
than their xed price competitors. Sellers can avoid the negative impact of " by switching to xed
pricing, which explains why the xed price outcome emerges as the unique equilibrium.
It is worth pointing out that the xed price equilibrium arises not because buyers would not
bargain anyway (because of the negative "), but because o¤ering exible pricing causes sellers to
lose on prots, and therefore, in equilibrium no venue o¤ers this option in the rst place. Indeed in
the proof of the Proposition we consider the out of equilibrium scenario where a rm o¤ers exible
pricing and we assume that high typesbargaining power is su¢ ciently large to ensure that, even
after accounting for the negative "; they would still prefer bargaining over purchasing at the posted
price. (The other scenario where they would not even attempt negotiating trivially yields a xed
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price outcome.) We show that along this scenario the negative " lters into the exible rms prot,
and the rm is better o¤ by unilaterally switching to xed pricing.
This nding suggests that from a sellers point of view the exible pricing strategy is not a
viable option if potential customers indeed dislike the haggling process. More specically, if sellers
realize that even potential hagglers might dislike bargaining for their products (e.g. due to the fear
of being seen unclassy) and they can not e¤ectively reduce or eliminate such displeasure, perhaps
due to product characteristics, then they have an incentive to practice xed pricing.
Finally, we turn the case where customers get a psychological satisfaction if they manage to
purchase the item below the posted price.
5 Characterization of Equilibria when Customers Enjoy Bargain-
ing
Proposition 3 Suppose " is positive but su¢ ciently small:
 Full Segmentation Equilibrium (Eq-FS): If   ~t; where
~t  z1(q

h;b;t)
1 z0(qh;b;t)  
"z1(qh;b;t)q

h;b;t
[1 z0(qh;b;t)][1 uh;t+1 t+1+"]
(19)
then there exists a unique equilibrium where a fraction 'f;t < t of rms choose xed pricing
while the rest opt for exible pricing. Equilibrium prices are given by
rf;t = 1  ul;t+1  
z1(ql;f;t)
1 z0(ql;f;t) (1  ul;t+1   t+1) (20)
rb;t = 1  uh;t+1  
z1(qh;b;t)(1 )
1 z0(qh;b;t) z1(qh;b;t)
h
1  uh;t+1   t+1 + "  q

h;b;t"
1 
i
(21)
yt = 1  uh;t+1    (1  uh;t+1   t+1) + " (1  ) : (22)
The equilibrium is characterized by full segmentation of customers: low types avoid exible
rms and high types avoid xed price rms. Expected demands satisfy qh;b;t <  < q

l;f;t; i.e.
exible rms attract fewer customers than xed price rms: Equilibrium payo¤s are as follows
t = 1  ul;t+1   [z0(ql;f;t) + z1(ql;f;t)] (1  ul;t+1   t+1) (23)
uh;t = z0(q

h;b;t) (1  uh;t+1   t+1) + [z0(qh;b;t)  z1(qh;b;t)]"+ uh;t+1 (24)
ul;t = z0(q

l;f;t)[1  ul;t+1   t+1] + ul;t+1 (25)
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 Fixed Price Equilibrium (Eq-FP): If  < ~t then xed pricing emerges as the unique
equilibrium. For characterization see item Eq-FP in Proposition 1.
When compared to the benchmark case " = 0; the introduction of a positive " leads to two
important results: uniqueness of the equilibrium, instead of a continuum of equilibria, and full
segmentation of customers, instead of partial segmentation. The multiplicity of equilibria in the
benchmark case is disturbing for two reasons. First, the model loses predictive power as one cannot
know how many rms are rm with the price and how many are exible. Second, and perhaps
more worrisome, is the presence of an equilibrium where the fraction of xed price sellers 'f;t may,
in fact, be equal to 1, i.e. a xed price outcome where no seller o¤ers exible pricing, despite the
availability of bargaining and despite the fact that high types are su¢ ciently skilled in negotiations.
The introduction of a positive " eliminates the continuum of equilibria, and instead, yields a unique
equilibrium. To understand why, notice that in the benchmark if su¢ ciently many sellers pick xed
pricing, then the marginal seller is indi¤erent between picking either pricing rule, which is why there
is a continuum of equilibria where 'f;t can be anywhere between t and 1. But if " > 0 then the
marginal seller is strictly better o¤ picking exible pricing, because, compared to the benchmark,
buyers have a larger appetite for exible deals, yet there are not su¢ ciently many sellers o¤ering
such deals. The marginal seller can earn more if he deviates to exible pricing, which explains why
the introduction of a positive " unsettles the aforementioned indi¤erence and leads to a unique
equilibrium.
The equilibrium is characterized by full segmentation of customers: low types avoid exible
rms whereas high types avoid xed price rms. The reason behind the rst relationship is the
same as in the benchmark: exible rms post negotiable but high prices, but non-hagglers cannot
negotiate; hence they avoid these rms. The second relationship is due to the positive ": In the
benchmark model high types were indi¤erent between xed and exible rms, so they would shop
anywhere. The introduction of " unsettles this indi¤erence in favor of exible venues because in
this setting high types not only are able to bargain down the list price but also get some additional
satisfaction from doing so.9
9Proposition 3 requires " to be positive but small. If " is large, then there exists a corner equilibrium, where
all sellers choose exible pricing and low type buyers have no choice but to shop at these stores and pay inated
list prices. We do not focus on this outcome, because " is assumed to be a small psychological factor, whereas this
outcome requires " to be so large to convince all sellers to ignore low types in order to lure the more lucrative high
types.
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In our model we a-priori classify buyers as hagglers and non-hagglers, and then, obtain the
segmentation result along those lines (hagglers to exible stores vs. non-hagglers to xed price
stores). Thus, it may seem that the exogenous classication of buyers in terms of their bargaining
abilities is necessary for the segmentation result; but this is not the case. Consider a scenario where
buyers are identical in terms of their bargaining skills but di¤er in terms of their enjoyment for the
bargaining experience, proxied by the parameter ": Imagine that " varies in an interval ["1; "N ],
where "1 < 0 and "N > 0; and that buyers are divided into N separate groups, where group 1 has
the lowest " and group N has the highest, that is "1 < "2 < ::: < "N : We show that if the gap
between "N and "N 1 is su¢ ciently large, then there exists an equilibrium, where bargaining deals
are designated for the most enthusiastic type only that is, in equilibrium type N customers hunt
for bargaining deals and shop at exible stores, while everyone else shops at xed price stores. This
outcome is similar to Eq-FS in that it generates segmentation among customers. In addition, along
this variation the division of hagglers vs. non-hagglers emerges as an endogenous phenomenon, in
that type N customers turn into hagglers whereas remaining customers do not haggle at all. (The
proof of this result can be found in the Online Appendix 2.)
The result on self selection and segmentation is indeed important as it shows that the type of
demand a rm gets strategically depends on the pricing rule it selects at the rst place. As indicated
in the Introduction, most of the existing literature in pricing strategies assume a non-competitive
environment, typically a monopolist seller, where heterogenous customers (myopic, strategic etc.)
are assumed to arrive at an exogenous rate and irrespective of the pricing rule in place. Our result,
however, suggests that if the exogenous demand assumption is relaxed then due to self-selection
some customers may not visit certain rms in the rst place.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that customers indeed love the feeling of purchasing the item below
the posted price and that they inevitably gravitate towards outlets o¤ering such deals. Retail giant
JC Penney made a bold move in January 2012 by ridding their stores of all discounts, sales and
bargains in an e¤ort to establish "fair and square" pricing. Unfortunately, for JC Penney, this
strategy did not work as its core consumers, who were accustomed to sales and bargains, began
leaving the retailer in droves. At the end, the now ousted CEO Ron Johnson had to confess this
(Tuttle, 2013):
I thought people were just tired of coupons and all this stu¤. The reality is all of
the couponing we did, there were a certain part of the customers that loved that. They
gravitated to stores that competed that way. So our core customer, I think was much
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more dependent, and enjoyed coupons more than I understood.
While this example illustrates how customersenjoyment of the selling institution itself may
have signicant implications, we note that enjoyment of coupons is not the same as enjoyment of
bargaining. There are apparent di¤erences between the two cases including the rules, deadlines,
contexts and specic processes associated with coupons. However despite these di¤erences, one
can identify broad similarities between coupons and bargaining. First, in both cases, customers
who are willing to exert e¤ort (either by engaging in haggling or by being diligent enough to
monitor deals from Hi/Lo retailers) may get rewarded with lower prices. Second, in both cases,
even with additional e¤ort, obtaining a deal is not guaranteed with limited availability items (as
demand may rise endogenously depending on the appeal of the pricing/promotion policy). Third,
customers may possibly gain additional non-economic pleasure with feelings of excitement, mastery
and competence from getting discounts via coupons or bargaining.
To understand how equilibrium objects change with respect to " we simulate prices and the
fraction of rms adopting exible pricing against " and calendar time t. The simulations are based
on a stationary environment where outgoing agents are assumed to be replaced with clones; thus
t, bt and st remain constant throughout all market activity: The stationarity of the environment
ensures that the observed dynamics do not stem from uctuations in the number or composition
of buyers and sellers.10
Price trajectories in 1a and 1b reveal that for any given t; the equilibrium xed price and the
exible list price both increase in "; implying that sellers take advantage of the positive utility
enjoyed by hagglers in the form of higher prices. Remarkably xed price sellers, who do not even
cater to hagglers, also raise their prices if " goes up. The mechanism behind this spillover e¤ect is
this. As " goes up, more rms o¤er exible pricing (see panel 1c) and fewer rms o¤er xed pricing.
Since xed price rms are the only outlets where non-hagglers can shop, the expected demand at
xed price rms goes up. The rising demand, naturally, leads to higher prices. The fact that xed
price rms get more crowded and charge higher prices points to another interesting spillover e¤ect
in that non-bargaining customers, who shop only at xed price rms, end up receiving less utility
10The simulations are based on the following parametrization: b1 = s1 = 1; 1 = 0:5,  = 0:6, T = 25 and  = 0:9.
The terminal payo¤s, uT+1 and T+1, are both assumed to be zero. The parameter " ranges from 0 to 0:05.
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when haggling customers enjoy bargaining.11
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1c: Fraction of Flexible Stores
Figure 1: Equilibrium Market Dynamics against t and "
A variety of markets operate on implicit or explicit deadlines, and those deadlines inevitably have
a bearing on price dynamics. In our model, the simulations are based on a setting with a nite
T , which allows us to study such deadline e¤ects on prices and the percentage of sellers adopting
each pricing rule. Price trajectories with respect to the calendar time t reveal that if the deadline
is su¢ ciently far away (i.e. when t is small) then sellers list higher prices. As the deadline nears,
however, prices start to fall. The pattern is more visible for larger values of ": Indeed, if "  0
then prices remain rather at over time, however if "  0:05 then they clearly exhibit a falling
pattern. The reason is this. When t is small, sellers are not worried about not being able to trade
as they know the market will remain active for a long while. So, they list higher prices in order to
take advantage of the presence of high type buyers and benet from the positive " they bring with.
Towards the end of the market however, the fear of not being able to sell and walking out empty
handed kicks in, as such, prices start to fall.12 Notice that, the drop in prices is only gradual and
it does not warrant buyers to delay their purchase. As discussed earlier, in equilibrium, players
11We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out the second relationship between " and its impact on the non-
bargaining customersutility.
12 In Figure 1a, taking " = 0 as a benchmark, we observe that exible sellers add a premium to their prices as " goes
up and during the initial periods this premium can exceed ". To see why, recall that customers pay this full price only
with some positive probability. With the remainder probability, they negotiate and pay a lower price plus they enjoy
" on top. Thus, on expected terms they are still better o¤ compared to the benchmark even though the premium may
exceed ": The premium is highest during the initial periods, because, early on, many stores o¤er exible pricing, and
the higher the number of such stores, the less crowded they are. This, in turn, means that their customers are very
likely to negotiate a discount. To cover themselves against such likely discounts, the stores raise the aforementioned
premium. As the deadline approaches the number of exible stores decreases; thus, the premium starts to shrink.
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are better o¤ trading immediately rather than waiting. The deadline e¤ect can be augmented by
considering imbalances in terminal payo¤s of buyers and sellers: Suppose, for instance, that sellers
have the option to liquidate unsold items in a secondary market that starts at the end of the rst
market, i.e. suppose that T+1 > 0 (buyersterminal payo¤ is still uT+1 = 0). Along this scenario,
the payo¤ T+1 lters into the prices and prevents them from falling too much even when the
deadline is near.
Another observation is that the equilibrium percentage of sellers adopting exible pricing falls
in t (panel 1c). To see why, notice that along Eq-FS exible stores attract, on average, fewer
customers than xed price stores; thus, they are less likely to make a sale. Initially sellers are not
too worried about not being able to trade, so a large number of them remain exible in an e¤ort
to trade with high type customers. But as t grows large, sellers start to switch to xed pricing to
maximize their likelihood of making a sale.
Panel 1c further reveals that the percentage of sellers adopting exible pricing rises in ": The
intuition is that exible sellers are able to convert a larger " into higher prices, and thereby, into
higher prots. The market is competitive; so, if " rises then more sellers become exible in an
e¤ort to take advantage of this opportunity. The next proposition summarizes the discussion above
analytically. (The proof is in the Online Appendix 1.)
Proposition 4 The equilibrium prot t rises in ":
In order to prove the proposition, we start by establishing that the expected utility of low types,
ul;t, falls in ". In words, low type (non-bargaining) customers, who shop only at xed price rms,
end up receiving less utility when haggling customers" increases. Recall that we have seen this
spillover e¤ect in the simulations above. In the proof of the proposition, we establish this result
analytically. Next, we show that sellersprot increases as ul;t decreases, thus the result in the
proposition follows.
The proposition suggests that sellers may convert a positive " into higher prices and prots.
This, then, indicates that rmsattempt to raise customersenjoyment of the bargaining process
(e.g. through such actions as better training of the salesforce to be highly courteous during bar-
gaining, providing a relaxing environment for price negotiation, among others) may be a protable
strategy.
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6 Price Dynamics
In this section we explore how equilibrium prices respond to uctuations in expected demand. We
proxy the expected demand by the buyer-seller ratio t = bt=st since along Eq-PS and Eq-FP the
expected demand at each store is equal to t; whereas along Eq-FS expected demands qh;b;t and
ql;f;t are proportional to it (they increase if t increases and they fall if it falls).
To determine the trajectory of t one needs to focus on how the measures of buyers and sellers
evolve over time. Recall that the market starts with a measure of s1 sellers and b1 buyers, of which
a fraction 1 are low types. At the end of each period, trading players leave the market and the
ones who could not trade move to the next period to play the same game. In addition, at the
beginning of each period t = 2; 3::: a new cohort of snewt sellers and b
new
t buyers, of which a fraction
newt are low types, enter the market joining the existing players. The proposition below pins down
how these measures evolve over time.
Proposition 5 Along Eq-PS and Eq-FP the measures of buyers and sellers evolve according to
bt = b
new
t + bt 1   st 1(1  z0 (t 1)) and st = snewt + st 1z0 (t 1) for t  2: (26)
The fraction of non-hagglers, on the other hand, evolves according to
t = [b
new
t 
new
t + bt 1t 1   t 1st 1(1  z0 (t))]=bt: (27)
Specically if newt = 1 then t = 1 for all t  2: Along Eq-FS we have
bt = b
new
t + bt 1   (lt 1 + ht 1) and st = snewt + st 1   (lt 1 + ht 1)
where lt 1  st 1'f;t 1[1   z0(qf;t 1)] and ht 1  st 1(1   'f;t 1)[1   z0(qh;t 1)]. The fraction of
non-hagglers evolves according to t = [bt 1t 1   lt 1 + newt bnewt ]=bt:
Given the equations governing bt and st, one can pin down how t evolves over time and then,
via reverse engineering, one can impose specic trajectories on t. To see how, note that along
Eq-PS or Eq-FP we have
t =
bnewt + bt 1   st 1(1  e t 1)
snewt + st 1e t 1
for t  2: (28)
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The trajectory is endogenous but it is partly driven by the measures of incoming cohorts bnewt
and snewt , which are exogenous. This means that one can reverse engineer and pick the exogenous
numbers in such a way that the trajectory follows a particular pattern one may have in mind.
Specically, we consider seasonal cycles where t starts low in the beginning of the cycle, peaks in
the middle of the cycle and subsides towards the end of the cycle and each such cycle lasts, say, k
periods, that is t = t+k; for some integer k: For instance consider a case with k = 2, where the
market alternates between episodes of high and low demand. Suppose in odd periods we want to
have odd = 0:5 and in even periods even = 1: One can produce such cycles by picking starting
values, say, b1 = 1 and s1 = 2 and the new entrants as bnewt=even = 1:7; s
new
t=even = 0:7; b
new
t=odd = 0:3
and snewt=odd = 1:3:
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Figure 2: Price Dynamics in a Market with Seasonal Cycles
In the simulation we pick k = 12 and select the entering cohorts in such a way that the expected
13 In period 1 the buyer seller ratio equals to 1 = b1=s1 = 0:5: At the end of the period s1
 
1  e 1 = 0:8 buyers
and sellers trade and exit, which means that a measure of 1.2 sellers and 0.2 buyers are unable to trade so they move
to the next period. At the beginning of period 2, bnewt=even = 1:7; s
new
t=even = 0:7 enter the market; thus b2 = s2 = 1:9
and therefore 2 = 1: At the end of period 2, s2
 
1  e 2 = 1:2 buyers and sellers trade and exit; hence a measure
0.7 sellers and 0.7 buyers move to period 3. At the beggining of period 3, bnewt=odd = 0:3; s
new
t=odd = 1:3 join them; thus
b3 = 1 and s3 = 2 and therefore 3 = 0:5: And so on.
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demand follows a zigzag trajectory: the cycle starts when lambda is at its lowest value 0.6, then
it peaks at 2 in the middle of the season, then it declines back to 0.6 and then it starts again (see
Figure 2). In addition, for the sake of simplicity we assume that newt = 1 = 0:5 so that t remains
constant at 0:5 at all times.14
There are a few observations that stand out. First, prices seem to follow the same trajectory
as the expected demand t: they rise as t rises and they fall as it falls. The intuition is simple. If
t goes up then sellers face less competition to attract customers, so they post higher prices. If t
falls then they face sti¤er competition and cut their prices.
Second, the simulation conrms that the exible list price is indeed higher than the xed price.
As discussed earlier, exible sellers understand that they may well end up selling at a lower price
than what they initially post, so they inate the list price up-front to cover themselves against this
contingency.
Third, there is a time lag between prices and the expected demand prices seem to front-run the
expected demand by about two periods. Indeed, prices peak around t = 5, whereas the expected
demand peaks at t = 7. Similarly, prices dip at around t = 11, which, again, is well before t
reaches its own minimum at t = 13. To understand why, note that prices depend not only on the
current demand, but on the entire sequence ft+jgTj=0, as such, if the general outlook of future
demand turns negative, then prices start to fall even if demand keeps rising for a short while. For
instance at t = 6 sellers understand that demand will rise only for one more period, after which it
will fall for six consecutive periods until t = 13; so, they start cutting prices. By the time t peaks
at t = 7 prices have already started falling. The opposite happens at the end of the cycle. By the
time the demand dips at t = 13; prices have already started rising. (We remind the reader that
players, due to trade frictions, are always willing to transact immediately rather than waiting.)
The nal observation is that prices do not uctuate as much as the expected demand. Even
though the demand goes through sharp zigzags, prices follow much smoother trajectories with little
uctuation15. The reason is this. Prices depend on the entire demand sequence ft+jgTj=0 and if
14Note that in Eq-PS if newt = 1 then t = 1 for all t: In words, the fraction of low types remains constant at 1
throughout all market activity, provided that the fraction in the entrant cohorts is also 1: (This relationship holds in
Eq-FP as well, but this is rather immaterial because no one negotiates in Eq-FP.) To see why note that along Eq-PS
the expected demand at all rms is equal to t; thus all buyers trade and exit at the same rate. This means that the
ratio of hagglers to non hagglers is not disturbed by how fast di¤erent types of buyers exit the market. If this ratio
is not disturbed externally either, then t remains constant at 1 for all t  2: This relationship does not hold along
Eq-FS because in that equilibrium hagglers are more likely to trade than non hagglers, and they exit the market at
a faster rate. Simulations suggest that if we x newt = 1 then t converges to a level slightly above 1:
15 In the simulation, the maximum value of t is more than three times its minimum value, but for prices this ratio
is less than 1.5. Similarly, the coe¢ cient of variation for t is 0.32, whereas for prices it is less than 0.1.
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the terminal period T is su¢ ciently far away then sellers e¤ectively face a market with cyclical
demand that goes through periodic ups and downs. (In the simulation we have T = 360; which
means that the market goes through thirty cycles of twelve periods before it comes to an end.) With
cyclical demand, if  is su¢ ciently large then future total demand is more or less constant because
the variation in demand is mostly accounted for; hence prices do not uctuate as much. Indeed
as  ! 1 price trajectories converge to each other and they start to look like at lines. On the
other hand, as  ! 0 the impact of any lambda beyond, say, the current period becomes ignorable,
which leaves the current demand t as the dominant factor driving the prices. Consequently, price
trajectories start to follow the trajectory of the current demand t closely, exhibiting a similar
zigzag pattern.16
The parameter  (inversely) proxies the severity of trade frictions. A small value of  indicates
that players who are unable to buy or sell today incur signicant waiting costs before trying again
in the subsequent period. The discussion above suggests that uctuations in prices depend on the
degree of trade frictions. If trade frictions are severe (i.e. if waiting is costly) then prices move
signicantly; else, they remain stable even though the demand goes through sharp ups and downs.
In the simulation we have  = 0:8; which is a moderately high value; hence the stable prices. The
following proposition summarizes the discussion so far (the proof is in the Online Appendix 1).17
Proposition 6 Both in Eq-PS an in Eq-FP if T is su¢ ciently large then for all 1 < t  T we
have
lim
!1
yt = lim
!1
rb;t = lim
!1
rf;t = 0,
where yt  yt   yt 1 denotes the di¤erence in prices (rb;t and rf;t are likewise).
In marketing, the phenomenon of stable prices in the presence of uctuating demand and
supply is predominantly explained with fairness concerns, which originates from the principle of
dual entitlement put forward by Kahneman et al. (1986). This principle suggests, among others,
that customers have perceived fairness levels for both rm prots and retail prices, and it is not fair
for retailers to change the price arbitrarily, or just to increase the rms existing prot, for example,
by taking advantage of excess demand (Xia et al., 2004; Bolton et al., 2003; Anderson and Simester,
2008). In addition, the fact that prices are not that responsive to changes in costs or demand has
16We thank the AE for pointing out the interplay between the cyclicality of demand and stable prices.
17We restrict the Proposition within Eq-PS and Eq-FP because in the other equilibrium (Eq-FS) expected demands
qh;b;t and q

l;f;t have non-trivial closed form solutions rendering an analytic proof elusive. Numerical simulations,
however, suggest that along Eq-FS, too, prices tend to remain stable if  and T are large.
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also been analyzed in the economics literature by highlighting, inter alia, the role of consumersloss
aversion (Heidhues and K½oszegi, 2008), the risk of antagonizing customers (Anderson and Simester,
2010), or menu costs. While fairness concerns, or the fear of antagonizing customers could be drivers
of price stability in many markets, our results suggest that the phenomenon of stable prices can be
obtained as a result of market competition with forward looking rational players.
A second distinction of our paper is that, unlike the cited literature, which by default assume
xed pricing, price stability in our model obtains even when the selection of the pricing rule is
endogenous, and where the sale price may involve a non-trivial bargaining process. While forward
looking agents may facilitate smooth prices, it is not obvious whether (and under what pricing
rules) the smooth price phenomenon would emerge if sellers were allowed to trade via alternative
pricing rules. Our paper demonstrates that all prices the xed price, the exible list prices and
the bargained price remain stable despite the uctuating demand.
Admittedly, the phenomenon of stable prices may emerge in alternative settings with forward
looking customers and market competition, e.g., the aforecited literature studying pricing mecha-
nism selection (Eeckhout and Kircher, 2010; Virag, 2011). One can potentially obtain stable prices
if one constructs dynamic versions of these models, however, their static (one-shot) setups do not
allow them to investigate the issue of price stability. In contrast, our paper considers a dynamic
framework, which enables us to explore the issue of price stability in detail.
Many real world markets exhibit cyclical or seasonal demand patterns (Radas and Shugan,
1998; Gijsenberg, 2017), where periods of higher demand follow periods of lower demand. Recent
empirical research in marketing has documented such demand patterns and also examined the
evolution of observed prices along such cycles (Gijsenberg, 2017). A notable nding therein is the
relative stability of prices over time and the limited inuence of the demand cycles on the observed
prices. While their study context (consumer packaged goods) is clearly di¤erent than ours, the
observation appears to be quite similar to the price stability phenomenon we observe in our study. In
addition, anecdotal evidence suggests that markets that are known for signicant seasonal/cyclical
demand uctuations, such as the housing market, exhibit surprisingly stable prices, which fall quite
slowly during low-demand periods (so the average time of a house on the market substantially
increases) and do not increase as swiftly and signicantly as one would expect during high-demand
periods. Our results may provide a compelling reason for these observations in that the variation in
future demand gets to be largely accounted for in current prices, so, prices do not uctuate much.
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7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we develop economic intuition on the selection and dynamics of two popular pricing
rules xed price and exible price using the competitive search paradigm. Fixed pricing is plain
enough; exible pricing involves bargaining between the buyer and seller. Despite bargaining being
a common practice in many buying-selling situations, previous analytical models of bargaining in
marketing have mostly focused on business-to-business and channel relationships (Iyer and Villas-
Boas, 2003; Dukes et al., 2006; Guo and Iyer, 2013), leaving room for models investigating the
practice of bargaining by customers. In addition, non-economic dynamics such as pleasure or
displeasure associated with bargaining could play a role during such transactions. As such, our
modeling approach attempts to incorporate this additional non-economic element into the model.
As xed and exible pricing coexist in many modern day markets, it is important to gain a
better conceptual understanding of these pricing strategies. In this paper, we provide a theoret-
ical rationale for rmsselection and strategic implications of xed and exible pricing in a fully
competitive setting by focusing on decentralized markets such as housing or used cars. Fixed and
exible pricing formats, of course, are not exclusive to these markets, and they coexist in a variety
of marketplaces. For example in many classied advertisement websites such as Craigslist, one
observes indicators for both exible price selling (OBOor best o¤er) and xed price selling (e.g.,
"sharp price") for seemingly similar items. Similarly, on eBay, in addition to the auction setup,
individuals typically have two other options to sell the product: (i) using a xed price (Buy It
Now) or (ii) using a exible price option, under which the seller can either accept the o¤er, decline
it, or respond with a counter o¤er.
Our study has also connections to research on everyday low pricing (EDLP) and promotional
(Hi/Lo) pricing strategies employed by retailers (Lal and Rao, 1997; Ho et al., 1998; Ellickson and
Misra, 2008). Fixed pricing resembles EDLP, and exible pricing resembles Hi/Lo pricing in some
ways. As such, our setting has some distinctions and similarities with EDLP and promotional
pricing. The di¤erences include the focus on buyers shopping for a single item in our case, whereas
customers shopping for a set of items or product categories in EDLP and Hi/Lo research. Also,
while search and trade frictions play an essential role in our model, these are typically small or
negligible for EDLP and Hi/Lo settings.
Despite these di¤erences, there are some noteworthy similarities. First, both in Hi/Lo settings
and in our model, there is uncertainty pertaining the price. More specically, we have ex-ante
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price uncertainty in our model in that customers do not know whether they will get an opportunity
to negotiate with the seller before visiting the stores. (We do not have ex-post price uncertainty,
i.e., once customers arrive at stores, there is no uncertainty regarding the sale price). Such ex-
ante price uncertainty is somewhat similar to promotions at local Hi/Lo sellers where customers
may not be aware of those promotions before actually visiting the stores. A similar ex-ante price
uncertainty in Hi/Lo stores is that demand can endogenously rise as a result of the appeal of the
coupons/promotions, therefore, as in our model, there is no guarantee for a prospective customer
to obtain a deal if the item has limited availability.
Furthermore, there seems to be a broad correspondence between our model of xed vs. exible
pricing and EDLP vs. Hi/Lo pricing in terms of the role of consumer dynamics. In both cases,
consumersheterogeneity (e.g., some customers put additional e¤ort by engaging in bargaining or
by closely monitoring promotions, whereas others do no exert e¤ort) as well as their non-economic
aspects (e.g., enjoyment from bargaining) may have signicant implications for sellers choice of
pricing policies.
Finally, our article provides an important methodological contribution to the pricing literature in
marketing in that, in addition to Bertrand, Cournot, or Hotelling frameworks, our study underlines
the competitive search approach as an alternative way of capturing competition. The competitive
search approach is particularly suitable to model the pricing problem in decentralized markets
where search and trade frictions matter. Overall, we think that incorporating competitive search
models into marketing problems could open up a new avenue of research for scholars in this area.
Our paper has several limitations. First, we implicitly assume that sellers can commit to a
pricing rule and implement it without any costs. However, sellers may nd it di¢ cult to commit
to a xed price policy in markets where bargaining is widespread. A second issue pertains to the
enjoyment of bargaining, proxied by a positive ", which may be di¢ cult to justify. This is because
even if there is a non-economic benet of bargaining beyond the tangible benet of obtaining a
lower price, it is not clear if it is a rst order e¤ect. Furthermore, we take the positive " as given
while remaining agnostic about the factors, psychological or otherwise, generating it and explore
sellerspricing and buyersvisiting decisions in the presence of such a parameter. If such factors
are explicitly accounted for, then they may interact with other components of the model and lead
to non-trivial results. Therefore, the results regarding the positive " should be taken with caution.
Overall, while we recognize that our model is stylized and some of our modeling assumptions may
not apply to broader markets or product categories, we believe our paper is an important step
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towards a better understanding of xed and exible selling strategies.
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8 Online Appendix 1
8.1 Proof of Propositions 1, 2 and 3
The proof is by induction. In what follows we show that the claims in the propositions hold in the
terminal period T: Then we establish the inductive step. To start, substitute the terminal payo¤s
T+1 = uh;T+1 = ul;T+1 = 0 into (3), (4) and (5) to obtain
Uh;f;T = Ul;f;T =
1 z0(qh;f;T+ql;f;T )
qh;f;T+ql;f;T
(1  rf;T )
Ul;b;T =
1 z0(qh;b;T+ql;b;T )
qh;b;T+ql;b;T
(1  rb;T )
Uh;b;T = Ul;b;T + z0 (qh;b;T + ql;b;T ) (rb;T   yT + ") :
A high type buyer requests negotiations if yT < rb;T + ". This requires  to be large enough, which
we assume to be the case for now. The fact that yT < rb;T + " implies that Uh;b;T > Ul;b;T . At
xed price rms, on the other hand, we have Uh;f;T = Ul;f;T . It follows that Uh;T  Ul;T : Similarly,
substituting T+1 = 0 into prot functions (7) and (8) and re-arranging yields
f;T = 1  z0 (qh;f;T + ql;f;T )  qh;f;TUh;f;T   ql;f;TUl;f;T ; (8.1)
b;T = 1  z0 (qh;b;T + ql;b;T )  qh;b;TUh;b;T   ql;b;TUl;b;T + qh;b;T z0 (qh;b;T + ql;b;T ) ": (8.2)
Lemma 2 In a competitive search equilibrium all exible rms post the same list price rb;T and
cater to high type buyers only. Similarly, xed price rms post the same list price rf;T , but their
customer base depends on ". If "  0 then they cater to both types of customers but if " > 0 then
they cater to low types only.
1
The Lemma establishes how customer demographics would look like if a competitive search
equilibrium were to exist (it does not prove existence). These results greatly facilitate the charac-
terization of the equilibrium, which we accomplish subsequently.
Proof of Lemma 2. The proof consists of the following steps.
 Step 1. Flexible rms cannot attract both types of customers; they attract either the high
types (hagglers) or the low types (non-hagglers).
 Step 2. Flexible rms attract high types only.
 Step 3. Fixed price rms cannot attract high types only; they attract either both types or
just the low types.
 Step 4a. If "  0 then xed price rms attract both types of customers.
 Step 4b. If " > 0 then xed price rms attract low types only.
 Step 5. All exible rms post the same list price rb;T and all xed price rms post the same
list price rf;T :
Step 1. We prove that exible rms cannot attract both types of customers. By contradiction,
suppose they do, i.e. consider a exible rm where expected demands qh;b;T and ql;b;T are both
positive. This means that Uh;b;T = Uh;T and Ul;b;T = Ul;T : Recall that Uh;b;T > Ul;b;T : It follows
that Uh;T > Ul;T : The sellers prot equals to
b;T = 1  z0 (qh;b;T + ql;b;T )  qh;b;TUh;b;T   ql;b;TUl;b;T + qh;b;T z0 (qh;b;T + ql;b;T ) "
= 1  z0 (qh;b;T + ql;b;T )  (qh;b;T + ql;b;T )Ul;b;T  ;
where  := qh;b;T z0 (qh;b;T + ql;b;T ) (rb;T   yT + ") : Note that  is positive as rb;T   yT + " > 0:
Now suppose that this seller keeps his price intact at r = rb;T but changes the rule from exible
to xed. We claim that the seller loses all high type customers (qh;f;T = 0) but gains new low
type customers one-for-one, so that his new expected demand ql;f;T equals to his previous expected
demand qh;b;T + ql;b;T : Recall that Uh;f;T = Ul;f;T : Since Uh;T > Ul;T there are two possibilities:
 Uh;f;T = Uh;T and therefore Ul;f;T > Ul;T : This case is impossible since, Ul;f;T ; by denition,
cannot exceed the market utility Ul;T :
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 Ul;f;T = Ul;T and therefore Uh;f;T < Uh;T : This means that ql;f;T is positive and satises
Ul;f;T = Ul;T while qh;f;T = 0 since Uh;f;T < Uh;T : This scenario is possible.
Since Ul;f;T = Ul;T and Ul;b;T = Ul;T (from above) we have Ul;b;T = Ul;f;T . This implies that
1 z0(qh;b;T+ql;b;T )
qh;b;T+ql;b;T
(1  r) = 1 z0(ql;f;T )ql;f;T (1  r)
and therefore ql;f;T = qh;b;T + ql;b;T : So, by switching to xed pricing, the seller indeed keeps his
total demand intact. The seller now earns
f;T = 1  z0 (ql;f;T )  ql;f;TUl;f;T :
Using the equality ql;f;T = qh;b;T + ql;b;T it is easy to show that f;T  b;T =  > 0; i.e. the seller
earns more than he did before; hence the initial outcome could not be an equilibrium.
Step 2. We now show that exible rms attract high types only. Suppose the opposite is true
i.e. they attract low types only (the third scenario where they attract both types is ruled out in
Step 1). This means that Ul;b;T = Ul;T and Uh;b;T < Uh;T therefore ql;b;T > 0 and qh;b;T = 0: Recall
that Uh;b;T > Ul;b;T : It follows that Uh;T > Ul;T : According to our conjecture high types stay away
from exible rms, so they must be shopping at xed price rms. This means that Uh;f;T = Uh;T :
Recall, however, that Uh;f;T = Ul;f;T ; which implies Ul;f;T > Ul;T ; a contradiction since Ul;f;T  Ul;T
by denition.
Step 3. Suppose there is a xed price rm that caters just to high types. This implies Ul;f;T <
Ul;T and Uh;f;T = Uh;T : Recall that Uh;f;T = Ul;f;T : It follows that Uh;T < Ul;T ; a contradiction
since Uh;T  Ul;T :
Step 4a. We will show that if "  0 then xed price rms attract both types of customers. The
previous step established that xed price rms serve either both types of customers or low types
only. Below we rule out the second alternative.
By contradiction suppose xed price rms indeed attract low types only, i.e. suppose that
ql;f;T > 0 and qh;f;T = 0: This implies that Uh;f;T < Uh;T and Ul;f;T = Ul;T : Recall that Uh;f;T =
Ul;f;T ; hence Ul;T < Uh;T : From Step 2 we know that exible rms attract high types only, i.e.
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qh;b;T > 0 and ql;b;T = 0. This implies that Uh;b;T = Uh;T and Ul;b;T < Ul;T : A xed price rm solves
maxql;f;T2R+ 1  z0 (ql;f;T )  ql;f;TUl;f;T s.t. Ul;f;T = Ul;T :
The rst order condition (FOC) implies that
z0 (ql;f;T ) = Ul;T ) f;T = 1  z0 (ql;f;T )  z1 (ql;f;T ) :
Similarly a exible rm solves
maxqh;b;T2R+ 1  z0(qh;b;T )  qh;b;TUh;b;T + z1 (qh;b;T ) " s.t. Uh;b;T = Uh;T :
The FOC is given by
z0 (qh;b;T ) + [z0 (qh;b;T )  z1 (qh;b;T )] " = Uh;T :
Thus
b;T = 1  z0 (qh;b;T )  z1 (qh;b;T ) + qh;bz1 (qh;b;T ) ":
Suppose " = 0: Then the equal prot condition b;T = f;T implies that ql;f;T = qh;b;T : Substituting
this into the FOCs above we have Uh;T = Ul;T ; a contradiction since Ul;T < Uh;T . Now Suppose
" < 0: The equal prot condition implies that ql;f;T < qh;b;T : To see why x some qh;b;T and note
that f;T > b;T even when ql;f;T = qh;b;T because " < 0: The function f;T falls if ql;f;T decreases,
so if ql;f;T exceeds qh;b;T then f;T further exceeds b;T : It follows that for equal prots we must
have ql;f;T < qh;b;T : Recall that Uh;T > Ul;T : This requires
" 7 z0(ql;f;T ) z0(qh;b;T )
z0(qh;b;T )(1 qh;b;T ) if 1 7 qh;b;T :
Hence, there are two scenarios:
 1 > qh;b;T and " > z0(ql;f;T ) z0(qh;b;T )z0(qh;b;T )(1 qh;b;T ) : Recall that ql;f;T < qh;b;T : It follows that z0 (ql;f;T ) >
z0 (qh;b;T ) which in turn implies that " > 0; a contradiction since " < 0:
 1 < qh;b;T and " < z0(ql;f;T ) z0(qh;b;T )z0(qh;b;T )(1 qh;b;T ) : This case, too, produces a contradiction. To see why
note that the equal prot condition b;T = f;T implies that
" = [(1 + qh;b;T ) z0 (qh;b;t)  (1 + ql;f;T ) z0 (ql;f;T )] =q2h;b;T :
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Substituting this into the inequality above we need
z0 (qh;b;T )  z0 (ql;f;T ) > (qh;b;T   ql;f;T ) z0 (ql;f;T ) (qh;b;T   1) :
Since ql;f;T < qh;b;T and 1  qh;b;T < 0 the left hand side of the inequality is negative whereas
the right hand side is positive; a contradiction.
Step 4b. We show that if " > 0 then xed price rms cater to low types only. Step 3 establishes
that xed price rms cannot be catering to high types only. This leaves two possibilities: either
they serve both types or they serve low types only. Below we rule out the rst alternative, which
means that if an equilibrium exists where some sellers compete with xed pricing, then those sellers
must be catering to low types only.
To start, suppose, by contradiction, that there is a xed price seller who attracts both types
of customers, i.e. suppose that qh;f;T and ql;f;T are both positive and satisfy Uh;f;T = Uh;T and
Ul;f;T = Ul;T : Recall that Uh;f;T = Ul;f;T . It follows that Ul;T = Uh;T : Letting qf;T := qh;f;T + ql;f;T ,
a xed price seller solves
maxqf;T2R+ f;T = maxqf;T2R+ 1  z0 (qf;T )  qf;TUh;f;T s.t. Uh;f;T = Uh;T :
After substituting the constraint into the objective function, the FOC is given by
z0 (qf;T ) = Uh;T ) f;T = 1  z0 (qf;T )  z1 (qf;T ) : (8.3)
We argue that this seller would earn more if he were to switch to exible pricing. Note that after
such a switch he would attract high types only (Steps 1 and 2), i.e. qh;b;T > 0 and ql;b;T = 0: He
solves
maxqh;b;T2R+ b;T = maxqh;b;T2R+ 1  z0 (qh;b;T )  qh;b;TUh;b;T + z1 (qh;b;T ) " s.t. Uh;b;T = Uh;T :
The FOC is given by
z0 (qh;b;T ) + [z0 (qh;b;T )  z1 (qh;b;T )] " = Uh;T (8.4)
and therefore
b;T = 1  z0 (qh;b;T )  z1 (qh;b;T ) + qh;b;T z1 (qh;b) ":
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We can now compare expected prots and show that the deviation is protable, i.e. b;T > f;T :
To start note that expressions (8.3) and (8.4) together imply that
" =
z0(qf;T ) z0(qh;b;T )
z0(qh;b;T )(1 qh;b;T ) :
Recall that " is positive; thus qh;b;T 6= qf;T ; so we have either qf;T < qh;b;T or qf;T > qh;b;T .
 Suppose qf;T < qh;b;T . Under this specication we have f;T < b;T : To see why, x some
qh;b;T and note that f;T < b;T even when qf;T = qh;b;T : The function f;T decreases as qf;T
decreases, so if qf;T falls below qh;b;T then f;T falls further below b;T :
 Suppose qf;T > qh;b;T : Let  := b;T   f;T : We will show that  is positive. Substitute "
into b;T ; and use the fact that z1 (q) = qz0 (q) to obtain
 = (qf;T   qh;b;T ) z0 (qf;T ) + z0(qh;b;T ) z0(qf;T )qh;b;T 1 :
Since qf;T > qh;b;T the rst expression on the right hand side is positive. The inequality
qf;T > qh;b;T implies that z0 (qh;b;T ) > z0 (qf;T ) : For " to be positive the denominator must
be negative, hence we have qh;b;T > 1: It follows that the second expression, too, is positive.
Hence  is positive, which means that the deviation is protable, i.e. b;T > f;T :
Step 5. Recall from Step 3 that exible rms cater to high types only; so, consider such a rm
with price rb;T and expected demand qh;b;T : From Step 4b we know that its FOC is given by
z0 (qh;b;T ) [1 + "  "qh;b;T ] = Uh;T
Solving Uh;b;T = z0 (qh;b;T ) [1 + "  "qh;b;T ] for the list price rb;T we have
brb;T = 1  z1(qh;b;T )(yT "qh;b;T )1 z0(qh;b;T ) z1(qh;b;T ) :
Now consider another exible rm with price r0b;T and expected demand q
0
b;T : His FOC is given by
z0(q
0
h;b;T )[1 + "  "q0h;b;T ] = Uh;T :
Combining both FOCs we have q0h;b;T = qh;b;T . This, in turn, implies that br0b;T = brb;T as the price
function above is one-to-one. Going through similar steps one can show that xed price rms, too,
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post identical prices. This completes the proof of Lemma 2. 
Now we can start characterizing the equilibria. There are three cases.
8.1.1 Case 1: " = 0:
Per Lemma 2 if " = 0 then exible rms attract high types, i.e. we have Uh;b;T = Uh;T and
Ul;b;T < Ul;T and therefore qh;b;T > 0 and ql;b;T = 0: Substituting " = 0 and ql;b;T = 0 into (8.2)
yields
b;T = 1  z0 (qh;b;T )  qh;b;TUh;b;T :
The sellers problem is maxqh;b;T2R+ 1   z0(qh;b;T )   qh;b;TUh;b;T subject to Uh;b;T = Uh;T : After
substituting the constraint into the objective function, the rst order condition (FOC) is given
by z0 (qh;b;T ) = Uh;T : The second order condition is trivial, hence the solution corresponds to a
maximum. Substituting the FOC into b;T yields
b;T = 1  z0 (qh;b;T )  z1 (qh;b;T ) : (8.5)
Now consider a xed price seller. If " = 0 then xed price sellers attract both types of customers, i.e.
qh;f;T and ql;f;T are both positive and satisfy Uh;f;T = Uh;T and Ul;f;T = Ul;T : Since Uh;f;T = Ul;f;T
we have Ul;T = Uh;T : Letting qf;T := qh;f;T + ql;f;T denote the total demand, the xed price seller
solves
maxqf;T2R+ f;T = maxqf;T2R+ 1  z0 (qf;T )  qf;TUh;f;T s.t. Uh;f;T = Uh;T :
The FOC is given by z0 (qf;T ) = Uh;T . The sellers prot, therefore, is equal to
f;T = 1  z0 (qf;T )  z1 (qf;T ) : (8.6)
Both FOCs together imply that qh;f;T +ql;f;T = qh;b;T ; i.e. expected demands at a xed and exible
rm must be identical. Substituting this equality into the feasibility conditions in (13) and using
the fact that ql;b;T = 0 one obtains
qh;b;T = T ; qh;f;T = T ('

f;T   T )='f;T and ql;f;T = T T ='f;T ;
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where 'f;T denotes the fraction of xed price rms. Note that for any '

f;T 2 [T ; 1] expected
demands qh;f;T and ql;f;T are both positive and satisfy the relationship above. This means that
'f;T is indeterminate, so we have a continuum of equilibria where '

f;T can be anywhere in between
T and 1. Furthermore, in any given equilibrium exible sellers and xed price sellers have the
same expected demand T :
Now we can obtain equilibrium payo¤s and list prices. Recall that Ul;T = Uh;T = z0 (qh;b;T ) :
Since qh;b;T = T we have uT = z0 (T ). Similarly substituting qh;b;T = qf;T = T into (8.5)
and (8.6) yields sellersequilibrium prot f;T = b;T  T = 1   z0 (T )   z1 (T ) : Given that
uT = z0 (T ) one can obtain the equilibrium xed price by solving Uh;f;T = z0 (T ) for rf;T and the
equilibrium exible price by solving Uh;b;T = z0 (T ) for rb;T : We have
rf;T (T ) = 1  z1(T )1 z0(T ) and rb;T (T ) = 1 
z1(T )(1 )
1 z0(T ) z1(T ) :
Finally substituting " = 0 and uh;T+1 = 0 into (1) yields the equilibrium bargained price yT =
1   : Observe that expressions for rf;T , rb;T , yT ; T and uT can be obtained by substituting
uT+1 = T+1 = 0 into expressions (14), (15), (16), (17) and (18) on display in Proposition 1,
conrming the validity of the Proposition for the terminal period T .
So far we assumed that high type buyers are su¢ ciently skilled in bargaining. Now we can put
some structure behind this assumption: A buyer negotiates if yT  rb;T ; which, after substituting
for rb;T and re-arranging, is equivalent to    (T ) ; where  (T ) := z1 (T ) = [1  z0 (T )]. So,
high types negotiate if their bargaining power exceeds threshold  and purchase at the list price
otherwise. Straightforward algebra reveals that if  >  (T ) then rb;T (T ) > r

f;T (T ) > yT ; i.e.
exible rms advertise higher prices than xed price rms.
The case  <  (T ) is trivial. Since even hagglers do not nd it worthwhile to negotiate the list
price, the availability of bargaining becomes immaterial and the model collapses to a xed price
setting. Technically this is equivalent to the outcome where 't = 1; i.e. where all rms trade via
xed pricing, post rf;T and serve both types of customers. The total demand at each rm equals to
T , whereas the equilibrium payo¤s are still given by uT = z0 (T ) and T = 1  z0 (T )  z1 (T ) :
8.1.2 Case 2: " < 0:
In what follows we will show that if " < 0 then no rm adopts exible pricing. The proof is by
contradiction, i.e. suppose that an equilibrium exists where at least one rm adopts exible pricing.
8
We will show that this rm earns less than its xed price competitors. To start recall that if " < 0
then a exible rm attracts high types only while low types stay away (Lemma 2) i.e. Uh;b;T = Uh;T
and Ul;b;T < Ul;T hence qh;b;T > 0 and ql;b;T = 0: The exible rm solves
maxqh;b;T2R+ 1  z0(qh;b;T )  qh;b;TUh;b;T + z1 (qh;b;T ) " s.t. Uh;b;T = Uh;T :
The rst order condition is given by
z0 (qh;b;T ) + [z0 (qh;b;T )  z1 (qh;b;T )] " = Uh;T :
It follows that
b;T = 1  z0 (qh;b;T )  z1 (qh;b;T ) + qh;b;T z1 (qh;b;T ) ":
Now consider xed price rms. Per Lemma 2 they attract both types of customers i.e. qh;f;T > 0
and ql;f;T > 0 and satisfy Uh;f;T = Uh;T and Ul;f;T = Ul;T : Recall that Uh;f;T = Ul;f;T . It follows
that Ul;T = Uh;T : Letting qf;T := qh;f;T + ql;f;T ; a xed price seller solves
maxqf;T2R+ 1  z0 (qf;T )  qf;TUh;f;T s.t. Uh;f;T = Uh;T :
The FOC is given by z0 (qf;T ) = Uh;T ; therefore
f;T = 1  z0 (qf;T )  z1 (qf;T ) :
We will show f;T > b;T : First note that the FOCs together imply that
z0 (qh;b;T ) + [z0 (qh;b;T )  z1 (qh;b;T )] " = z0 (qf;T )) " = z0(qf;T ) z0(qh;b;T )z0(qh;b;T )(1 qh;b;T ) :
The fact that " < 0 implies that either we have (i) qf;T < qh;b;T and qh;b;T > 1 or we have (ii)
qf;T > qh;b;T and qh;b;T < 1: Now we can compare prots. Let   f;T  b;T : We will show that
 > 0: Note that
 = z0 (qh;b;T )  z0 (qf;T ) + z1 (qh;b;T )  z1 (qf;T )  qh;b;T z1 (qh;b;T ) "
=
z0(qh;b;T ) z0(qf;T )
1 qh;b;T   z0 (qf;T ) (qf;T   qh;b;T )
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The rst step follows after substituting for f;T and b;T whereas the second step is obtained after
substituting for " and noting that z1 (q) = qz0 (q) : Observe that under condition (i) both terms
of  are positive; hence  > 0. Under condition (ii) the rst term is positive but the second one
is negative so we need a closer inspection. Fix qh;b;T < 1 and note that  falls in qf;T under the
restrictions of (ii): It follows that  reaches a minimum when qf;T & qh;b;T (recall that under (ii)
we have qf;T > qh;b;T ). Note that limqf;T&qh;b;T  = 0; thus  > 0 when (ii) holds:
The inequality  > 0 implies that if xed and exible sellers compete in the same market then
xed price sellers earn more than exible sellers; so there cannot be an equilibrium where exible
pricing is adopted by any rm. The implication is that if " < 0 then the only possible outcome is
where all sellers trade via xed pricing, which we have already characterized in Case 1.
8.1.3 Case 3: " > 0:
Per Lemma 2 if " > 0 then exible stores attract high types only i.e. qh;b;T > 0 and ql;b;T = 0
satisfying Uh;b;T = Uh;T and Ul;b;T < Ul;T . Substitute ql;b;T = 0 into the expression of b;T to obtain
b;T = 1  z0 (qh;b;T )  qh;b;TUh;b;T + z1 (qh;b;T ) ":
The sellers problem is
max qh;b;T2R+ 1  z0(qh;b;T )  qh;b;TUh;b;T + z1 (qh;b;T ) " s.t. Uh;b;T = Uh;T :
The FOC is given by
z0 (qh;b;T ) + [z0 (qh;b;T )  z1 (qh;b;T )] " = Uh;T : (8.7)
The second order condition is satised if
 z0 (qh;b;T )  z0 (qh;b;T ) [2  qh;b;T ] " < 0: (8.8)
If qh;b;T  2 then the inequality is satised irrespective of ": If qh;b;T > 2 then we need " <
1=(qh;b;T   2): The right hand side is positive. Since " is assumed to be positive but small, the
inequality is satised; hence the the solution of the FOC yields a maximum.
Substituting (8.7) into b;T yields
b;T = 1  z0 (qh;b;T )  z1 (qh;b;T ) + qh;b;T z1 (qh;b;T ) ": (8.9)
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Now consider xed price sellers. They attract low types only (Lemma 2), i.e. qh;f;T = 0 and
ql;f;T > 0 satisfying Uh;f;T < Uh;T and Ul;f;T = Ul;T : Recall that Uh;f;T = Ul;f;T : It follows that
Uh;T > Ul;T : Substituting qh;f;T = 0 into the expression of f;T yields
f;T = 1  z0 (ql;f;T )  ql;f;TUl;f;T : (8.10)
The seller solves
1  z0 (ql;f;T )  ql;f;TUl;f;T s.t. Ul;f;T = Uh;T :
The FOC implies
z0 (ql;f;T ) = Ul;T and therefore f;T = 1  z0 (ql;f;T )  z1 (ql;f;T ) : (8.11)
Recall that 'f;T denotes the fraction of sellers who compete with xed pricing. Substituting
qh;f;T = ql;b;T = 0 into the feasibility conditions in (13) yields
ql;f;T = TT ='f;T and qh;b;T = (1  T )T =
 
1  'f;T

:
We will show that there exists a unique 'f;T 2 (0; T ) satisfying the equal prot condition f;T =
b;T ; proving the equilibrium exists and it is unique. Let ('f;T )  b;T  f;T : Combining (8.9)
and (8.11) it is easy to show that

 
'f;T

= z0(q

l;f;T ) + z1(q

l;f;T )  z0(qh;b;T )  z1(qh;b;T ) + qh;b;T z1(qh;b;T )":
Note that  rises in ql;b;T , which in turn rises in 'f;T ; and that  falls in ql;f;T ; which in turn falls
in 'f;T : It follows that d=d'f;T > 0: Furthermore note that (T ) > 0, whereas (0) < 0 if " is
small. To see why, note that (0) =  z0(q)  z1(q) + qz1(q)"; thus (0) < 0 if
" < (1 + q)=q2; where q  (1  T )T : (8.12)
The expression on the right hand side is positive. Since " is assumed to be positive but su¢ ciently
small, the inequality is satised. The Intermediate Value Theorem implies that there exists a unique
'f;T 2 (0; T ) satisfying ('f;T ) = 0: Since 'f;T < T we have qh;b;T < T < ql;f;T i.e. xed price
rms are more crowded than exible rms.
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The equilibrium payo¤s are immediate from the rst order conditions (8.7) and (8.11). We have
uh;T = z0(q

h;b;T ) +

z0(q

h;b;T )  z1(qh;b;T )

", ul;T = z0(q

l;f;T ); T = 1  z0(ql;f;T )  z1(ql;f;T ):
Given that high and low type buyers earn, respectively, uh;T and ul;T one can obtain the equilibrium
exible price by solving Uh;b;T = uh;T for rb;T and the equilibrium xed price by solving Ul;f;T = ul;T
for rf;T : We have
rb;T = 1 
z1(qh;b;t)(1 )
1 z0(qh;b;t) z1(qh;b;t)
h
1 + "  q

h;b;t"
1 
i
and rf;T = 1 
z1(ql;f;t)
1 z0(ql;f;t) :
Finally substituting T+1 = uh;T+1 = 0 into (1) yields the bargained price yT = (1  ) (1 + ") :
Observe that expressions for rf;T , r

b;T , y

T ; T ; uh;T and ul;T can be obtained by substituting
uh;T+1 = ul;T+1 = T+1 = 0 into (20), (21), (22), (23), (24) and (25) in Proposition 3, conrming
the validity of the Proposition for the terminal period T .
A high type buyer negotiates if yT  rb;T +": After substituting for rb;T and yT and re-arranging
this condition is equivalent to
  ~T  z1(q

h;b;T )
1 z0(qh;b;T )  
"z1(qh;b;T )q

h;b;T
(1+")[1 z0(qh;b;T )]
:
If  < ~T then even hagglers do not nd it worthwhile to negotiate the list price. The availabil-
ity of bargaining becomes immaterial and the model collapses to a xed price setting which was
characterized earlier in Case 1.
This completes the proof of the terminal period T . Going through a similar analytical process
one can establish the inductive step as well. As the analysis is largely the same the inductive step
is relegated to the Online Appendix 2.
8.2 Other Proofs
Proof of Proposition 4. In what follows we prove that dt=d" > 0 and dul;t=d" < 0, where t is
given by (23) and ul;t is given by (25). The proof is by induction, where we start with the terminal
period T: Substituting the terminal payo¤s ul;T+1 = T+1 = 0 into (23) and (25) yields
T = 1  z0(ql;f;T )  z1(ql;f;T ) and ul;T = z0(ql;f;T );
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and therefore
dT
d" = z1(q

l;f;T )
dql;f;T
d" and
dul;T
d" =  z0(ql;f;T )
dql;f;T
d" :
Our goal is to show that the rst derivative is positive and the second one is negative. Notice that
both relationships hold if dql;f;T =d" > 0, so below we establish that this is indeed the case. Let
T  b;T   f;T , where b;T is given by (8.9) and f;T is given by (8.10), and note that the
expected demand ql;f;T satises T = 0. By the implicit function theorem we have
dql;f;T
d" =   @T =@"@T =@ql;f;T :
Note that T rises in " and falls in ql;f;T : It follows that dq

l;f;T =d" > 0. This proves the claim for
period T: Now for the inductive step suppose that dt+1=d" > 0 and dul;t+1=d" < 0: We will show
that dt=d" > 0 and dul;t=d" < 0: Notice that
dt
d" =  
dul;t+1
d" 
h
1  z0(ql;f;t)  z1(ql;f;t)
i
+ dt+1d" [z0(q

l;f;t) + z1(q

l;f;t)]
+ (1  ul;t+1   t+1) z1(ql;f;t)
dql;f;t
d"
The rst line is positive due to the inductive step. Hence, in order to establish dt=d" > 0 it su¢ ces
to show that dql;f;t=d" > 0. Let t  b;t   f;t, where b;t is given by (9.9) and f;t is given by
(9.11), and note that ql;f;t satises t = 0. By the implicit function theorem we have
dql;f;t
d" =   @t=@"@t=@ql;f;t :
Note that t rises in " and falls in ql;f;t; thus dq

l;f;t=d" > 0. This proves the claim dt=d" > 0: The
other claim can be proved by going through similar steps. 
Proof of Proposition 5. Consider Eq-PS rst. Along this equilibrium path the expected
demand at any store at time t 1 is equal to t 1; so each seller trades with probability 1 z0 (t 1).
The law of large numbers implies that st 1(1   z0 (t 1)) sellers trade and exit the market. Each
transaction involves one seller and one buyer, so the total number of buyers who trade and exit is
also st 1(1 z0 (t 1)). The number of sellers present in period t is, then, st = snewt +st 1z0 (t 1) ;
whereas the number of buyers is bt = bnewt + bt 1   st 1(1  z0 (t 1)):
Now turn to the proportions of hagglers and non hagglers. In period t   1 the total demand
at any xed price rm equals to t 1 of which t 1t 1='f;t 1 are non-hagglers and t 1('

f;t 1  
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t 1)='f;t 1 are hagglers (Proposition 1). Since buyers are equally likely to be selected at the point
of transaction, the probability that the purchasing customer is going to be a low type equals to
t 1='f;t 1: There are '

f;t 1st 1 xed price rms present in the market, each seller trades with
probability 1  z0 (t 1) and each transaction involves one buyer and one seller; so, the number of
non-haggler customers who trade and exit equals to
'f;t 1st 1  (1  z0 (t 1))
t 1
'f;t 1
= t 1st 1(1  z0 (t 1)):
Remaining buyers move to period t. The number of non-hagglers present in period t, given by tbt;
equals to
tbt = b
new
t 
new
t + bt 1t 1   t 1st 1(1  z0 (t)):
It follows that t is given by expression (27), on display in Proposition 5. This completes the
discussion on Eq-PS. Along Eq-FP, as in Eq-PS, the expected demand at any store at time t   1
is equal to t 1 so bt and st evolve as in (26). The proportion of hagglers, too, evolves as in (27),
but this is rather irrelevant because along Eq-FP buyers do not negotiate anyway.
Now consider the nal scenario, Eq-FS, where non hagglers shop at xed price stores and
hagglers shop at exible stores. The number of xed price sellers trading and exiting the market at
time t   1 is equal to st 1'f;t 1(1   z0(qf;t 1))  lt 1 whereas the number exible sellers trading
and exiting the market is equal to st 1(1 'f;t 1)(1 z0(qh;t 1))  ht 1: Each transaction involves
one buyer and one seller; thus st = st 1  (lt 1+ ht 1) + snewt and bt = bt 1  (lt 1+ ht 1) + bnewt :
Finally note that there are bt 1t 1 non-hagglers in the market at t 1; of which lt 1 exit the market
while the rest move to period t: Therefore t = [bt 1t 1   lt 1 + newt bnewt ]=bt: This completes the
proof.
Proof of Remark 6. If "  0 then rf;t; t and ut are given by (14), (17) and (18). Letting
xt  1  ut   t these expressions can be re-written as follows:
t = 1  ut+1   [z0 (t) + z1 (t)]xt+1
ut = ut+1 + z0 (t)xt+1
rf;t = 1  ut+1   xt+1 z1(t)1 z0(t)
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Letting rf;t  rf;t   rf;t 1 and noting that xt = 1   + z1(t)xt+1 we have
rf;t = (1  )
h
z1(t 1)
1 z0(t 1)   ut+1
i
+ xt+1
h
z1(t)z1(t 1)
1 z0(t 1) + z0 (t) 
z1(t)
1 z0(t)
i
:
Our goal is to show that lim!1rf;t = 0: It is clear that if  ! 1 then the rst term, which is
a multiplicative of 1   ; will vanish; however the second term, which is a multiplicative of xt+1
needs some inspection. The equation xt = 1 + z1(t)xt+1 pins down the relationship between
xt and xt+1. Iteration on t yields
xt+1 = (1  )
241 + s 1X
i=1
i
iY
j=1
z1 (t+j)
35+ s sY
j=1
z1 (t+j) xt+1+s| {z }
O(s)
;
where s 2 N+ is an arbitrary integer: The terms z1 (t+j) are all strictly less than 1: Since T is
large, one can pick s large enough to ensure that O (s)  0; hence
xt+1  (1  )
241 + s 1X
i=1
i
iY
j=1
z1 (t+j)
35 :
Consequently we have lim!1 xt+1 = 0; and therefore lim!1rf;t = 0: This completes the proof
for rf;t: The remaining cases pertaining y

t and r

b;t can be proved similarly. 
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9 Online Appendix 2
9.1 Inductive Step
Our goal in this section is to establish that the claims in Propositions 1, 2 and 3 hold true in
period t; assuming they are true in period t+ 1: We start by re-arranging the expected payo¤s for
buyers and sellers. Noting that
P1
n=0
zn(q)
n+1 =
1 z0(q)
q ; the expression for Ui;f;t; given by (3), can be
re-written as
Ui;f;t =
1 z0(qh;f;t+ql;f;t)
qh;f;t+ql;f;t
(1  rf;t   ui;t+1) + ui;t+1: (9.1)
Similarly we have
Ul;b;t =
1 z0(qh;b;t+ql;b;t)
qh;b;t+ql;b;t
(1  rb;t   ul;t+1) + ul;t+1
Uh;b;t =
1 z0(qh;b;t+ql;b;t)
qh;b;t+ql;b;t
(1  rb;t   uh;t+1) + z0 (qh;b;t + ql;b;t) (rb;t + "  yt) + uh;t+1
(9.2)
Note that
Uh;b;t = Ul;b;t + z0 (qh;b;t + ql;b;t) (rb;t   yt + ") +

1  1 z0(qh;b;t+ql;b;t)qh;b;t+ql;b;t

 (uh;t+1   ul;t+1) :
(9.3)
Using these expressions we can now rewrite f;t and b;t: Equation (9.1) implies that
[1  z0 (qh;f;t + ql;f;t)] rf;t = [1  z0 (qh;f;t + ql;f;t)] (1  ui;t+1) + ui;t+1   (qh;f;t + ql;f;t)Ui;f;t
Substituting this relationship into (7) yields
f;t = 1  z0 (qh;f;t + ql;f;t) (1  t+1)  (qh;f;t + ql;f;t) (Ui;f;t   ui;t+1)
  [1  z0 (qh;f;t + ql;f;t)]ui;t+1:
(9.4)
Similarly combining (9.2), (9.3) with (8) yields
b;t = 1  uh;t+1   z0 (qh;b;t + ql;b;t) (1  t+1   uh;t+1)  qh;b;t (Uh;b;t   uh;t+1)
  ql;b;t (Ul;b;t   ul;t+1) + qh;b;tz0 (qh;b;t + ql;b;t) "+ 1 z0(qh;b;t+ql;b;t)qh;b;t+ql;b;t ql;b;t (uh;t+1   ul;t+1)
(9.5)
We can now start characterizing the equilibria. There are three cases: " = 0; " < 0 and " > 0:
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9.1.1 Case 1: " = 0:
Per the inductive assumption we have uh;t+1 = ul;t+1 = ut+1: Substituting uh;t+1 = ut+1 into (1)
yields the expression for the bargained price yt ; which is on display in Proposition 1 (equation
(16)). For now we assume that yt  rb;t; which requires  to be su¢ ciently large. Furthermore we
conjecture that players prefer to transact immediately rather than waiting (veried below).
One can show that exible rms post the same list price rb;t and cater to high types while xed
price rms post the same list price rf;t and cater to both types if "  0 and cater to low types if
" > 0. In other words, Lemma 2, which was valid in the terminal period T , is also valid in period
t. The proof is almost identical to the proof of Lemma 2; hence it is skipped here.
Since uh;t+1 = ul;t+1 we have Uh;f;t = Ul;f;t. In addition Uh;b;t > Ul;b;t since rb;t > yt: Now
consider a exible rm. Since exible rms attract high types only we have Uh;b;t (rb;t) = Uh;t and
Ul;b;t (rb;t) < Ul;t, and thus qh;b;t > 0 and ql;b;t = 0: Substituting these into (9.5) we have
b;t = 1  ut+1   z0 (qh;b;t) (1  t+1   ut+1)  qh;b;t (Uh;b;t   uh;t+1)
A exible rm solves maxqh;b;t2R+ b;t s.t. Uh;b;t (rb;t) = Uh;t: The FOC is given by
z0 (qh;b;t) [1  ut+1   t+1] = Uh;t   ut+1: (9.6)
The SOC is trivial, hence the solution to the FOC yields a maximum.
Fixed price rms attract both types of customers, i.e. Uh;f;t (rf;t) = Uh;t and Ul;f;t (rf;t) = Ul;t
thus qh;f;t > 0 and ql;f;t > 0: Note that uh;t+1 = ul;t+1 = ut+1 and that Uh;f;t = Ul;f;t: Thus f;t;
given by the expression in (9.4), becomes
f;t = 1  ut+1   z0 (qh;f;t + ql;f;t) (1  t+1   ut+1)  (qh;f;t + ql;f;t) (Uh;f;t   ut+1)
A xed price rms solves maxqh;f;t; ql;f;t2R2+ f;t s.t. Uh;f;t (rf;t) =
Uh;t and Ul;f;t (rf;t) = Ul;t: (It
appears that the seller faces two separate constraints, one for high types and one for low types.
Recall, however, that Uh;f;t = Ul;f;t; which, in turn, implies that Ul;t = Uh;t; thus both constraints
are identical.) The FOC implies that
z0 (qh;f;t + ql;f;t) [1  ut+1   t+1] = Uh;t   ut+1: (9.7)
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FOCs (9.6) and (9.7) together imply that qh;f;t + ql;f;t = qh;b;t; i.e. expected demands at all rms,
xed or exible, should be identical. Substitute ql;b;t = 0 into the feasibility constraint (13) and
use the fact that qh;f;t + ql;f;t = qh;b;t to obtain
qh;b;t = t; qh;f;t = t('

f;t   t)='f;t and ql;f;t = tt='f;t:
Note that, 'f;t is indeterminate and can take any value within [t; 1] ; hence, there is a continuum
of equilibria where any fraction 'f;t  t of sellers compete via xed pricing while the rest compete
via exible pricing. In addition, note that in any equilibrium the total expected demand at each
rm equals to t:
Now we can characterize prices. Combining the FOC (9.6) with indi¤erence constraint Uh;b;t (rb;t) =
Uh;t yields
z0 (t) [1  ut+1   t+1] = Uh;b;t (rb;t)  ut+1;
where Uh;b;t is given by (9.2). Solving this equality for rb;t yields expression (15), on display in
Proposition 1. Similarly the FOC (9.7) along with Uh;f;t (rf;t) = Uh;t implies
z0 (t) [1  ut+1   t+1] = Uh;f;t (rf;t)  ut+1;
where Uh;f;t is given by (9.1). Solving this equality for rf;t yields expression (14), on display in
Proposition 1. High type buyers negotiate if rb;t  yt ; which, after substituting for rb;t and yt , is
equivalent to   t  z1 (t) = [1  z0 (t)] : Given the expressions for rf;t and rb;t one can verify
that the equilibrium payo¤s t and ut are indeed as in Proposition 1 (equations (17) and (18)). In
addition note that if  > t then rb;t > r

f;t > yt.
If  < t then rb;t < yt; thus no bargaining takes place as the list price r

b;t falls below the
bargained price yt . In this parameter region the model collapses to a xed-price setting where
't = 1; i.e. where all sellers trade via xed pricing and post rf;t serving both types of customers.
The equilibrium demand at each rm is t and the expected payo¤s for buyers and sellers remain
the same as in (17) and (18).
Transact Now or Wait? The inequality in prices raises the issue of whether players should
keep searching for better deals. Below we prove that they are better o¤ trading immediately instead
of waiting. There are two cases: (i)   t and (ii)  < t:
Eq-PS: If   t then xed and exible stores coexist in the same market and prices satisfy
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rb;t > r

f;t > y

t . The worst case scenario for a buyer is buying at the highest price r

b;t whereas the
worst case scenario for a seller is selling at the lowest price yt : If players transact at these prices
then they clearly would transact at more favorable prices.
Consider a buyer who contemplates trading at rb;t: He purchases if 1  rb;t > ut+1; i.e. if the
immediate surplus is greater than the present value of search in the next period. After substituting
for rb;t the inequality is satised if 1   ut+1   t+1 > 0: One can verify that the expression on
the left hand side is positive: To see why use the expressions for ut and t to obtain xt = 1   +
z1 (t)xt+1; where xt  1    (ut + t) : We want to show that xt is positive for all t = 1; 2; :::T:
Note that if xt+1 > 0 then xt > 0: Substituting the terminal conditions uT+1 = T+1 = 0 yields
xT = 1; which, of course, is positive. Hence xt is positive for all t < T: Since the expression is
positive, the buyer is better o¤ purchasing at rb;t rather than waiting. Since the buyer is willing to
transact in this worst case scenario, it is clear that he is ready to transact at lower prices rf;t and
yt as well.
Now consider a seller. The worst case scenario for him is to sell at yt : He agrees to transact if
yt > t+1; which, after substituting for yt ; is equivalent to 1  ut+1   t+1 > 0: We know this
inequality holds, so the seller, too, wishes to sell instead of walking away. Since he is willing to sell
at yt , it is clear that he is ready to sell at higher prices rf;t and r

b;t as well.
Eq-FP: If   t then all sellers compete via xed pricing and post rf;t. A buyer transacts if
1  rf;t > ut+1; which after substituting for rf;t is equivalent to
(1  ut+1   t+1) z1(t)=[1  z0(t)] > 0:
Since the term 1   ut+1   t+1 is positive the inequality holds. Similarly the seller transacts if
rf;t > t+1; which is equivalent to
(1  ut+1   t+1) [1  z1(t)=[1  z0(t)]] > 0
Both expressions inside the parentheses are positive hence the inequality holds.
9.1.2 Case 2: " < 0:
As in the terminal period, we will show that if " < 0 then there cannot be an equilibrium where
rms adopt exible pricing. The proof is by contradiction, i.e. suppose that there is an equilibrium
where a rm adopts exible pricing. We will show that this rm earns less than its xed price
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competitors. Recall that if " < 0 then a exible rm attracts high types only while low types stay
away i.e. Uh;b;t = Uh;t and Ul;b;t < Ul;t hence qh;b;t > 0 and ql;b;t = 0: Substituting ql;b;t = 0 along
with the fact that uh;t+1 = ul;t+1 = ut+1 (inductive step) into expression (9.5) we have
b;t = 1  ut+1   z0 (qh;b;t) (1  t+1   ut+1)  qh;b;t (Uh;b;t   ut+1) + z1 (qh;b;t) "
A exible rm solves maxqh;b;t2R+ b;t s.t. Uh;b;t = Uh;t: The FOC is given by
z0 (qh;b;t) (1  t+1   ut+1) + [z0 (qh;b;t)  z1 (qh;b;t)] " = Uh;t   ut+1:
The second order condition is trivial since " < 0: It follows that
b;t = 1  ut+1   (z0 (qh;b;t) + z1 (qh;b;t)) (1  t+1   ut+1) + qh;b;tz1 (qh;b;t) "
Now consider xed price rms. They attract both types of customers i.e. qh;f;t > 0 and ql;f;t > 0
and satisfy Uh;f;t = Uh;t and Ul;f;t = Ul;t: Since uh;t+1 = ul;t+1 = ut+1 we have Uh;f;t = Ul;f;t; and
therefore Ul;t = Uh;t: It follows that f;t; given by (9.4), becomes
f;t = 1  ut+1   z0 (qh;f;t + ql;f;t) (1  t+1   ut+1)  (qh;f;t + ql;f;t) (Uh;f;t   ut+1) ;
Letting qf;t  qh;f;t + ql;f;t; a xed price rm solves maxqf;t2R+ f;t s.t. Uh;f;t (rf;t) = Uh;t: The
FOC implies that
z0 (qf;t) (1  ut+1   t+1) = Uh;t   ut+1:
Hence
f;t = 1  ut+1   (z0 (qf;t) + z1 (qf;t)) (1  t+1   ut+1) :
We will show f;t > b;t: First note that the FOCs together imply that
" =
z0(qf;t) z0(qh;b;t)
z0(qh;b;t)(1 qh;b;t) (1  ut+1   t+1) :
Observe that 1   ut+1   t+1 is positive; thus the inequality " < 0 implies that either we have
(i) qf;t < qh;b;t and qh;b;t > 1 or we have (ii) qf;t > qh;b;t and qh;b;t < 1:
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Now, let   f;t  b;t: We will show that  > 0: Note that
 = [z0 (qh;b;t)  z0 (qf;t) + z1 (qh;b;t)  z1 (qf;t)] (1  ut+1   t+1)  qh;b;tz1 (qh;b;t) "
=

z0(qh;b;t) z0(qf;t)
1 qh;b;t   z0 (qf;t) (qf;t   qh;b;t)

(1  ut+1   t+1)
The rst step follows after substituting for f;t and b;t whereas the second step is obtained after
substituting for " and noting that z1 (q) = qz0 (q) : The term 1   ut+1   t+1 is positive; thus
focus on the expression inside the curly brackets (call it 
). Under condition (i) both terms of 

are positive; hence  > 0. Under condition (ii) the rst term of 
 is positive but the second one
is negative so it needs a closer inspection. Fix qh;b;t < 1 and note that 
 falls in qf;t under the
restrictions of (ii): It follows that 
 reaches a minimum when qf;t & qh;b;t (recall that under (ii)
we have qf;t > qh;b;t): Note that limqf;t&qh;b;t 
 = 0: Hence 
 > 0 and therefore  > 0 in the region
qf;t > qh;b;t:
The fact that  > 0 implies that xed price sellers earn more than exible sellers; hence there
cannot be an equilibrium where exible pricing is adopted. The implication is that if " < 0 then
the only possible outcome is the one where all sellers adopt xed pricing (Eq-FP), which we have
already characterized in Case 1.
9.1.3 Case 3: " > 0.
If " > 0 then exible rms cater to high types only i.e. Uh;b;t (rb;t) = Uh;t and Ul;b;t (rb;t) < Ul;t
thus qh;b;t > 0 and ql;b;t = 0: Substitute ql;b;t = 0 into b;t, given by (9.5), and use the fact that
z1 (q) = qz0 (q) to obtain
b;t = 1  uh;t+1   z0 (qh;b;t) (1  uh;t+1   t+1)  qh;b;t (Uh;b;t   uh;t+1) + z1 (qh;b;t) "
A exible rms problem is maxqh;b;t2R+ b;t s.t. Uh;b;t (rb;t) = Uh;t: The FOC is given by
z0 (qh;b;t) (1  uh;t+1   t+1) + [z0 (qh;b;t)  z1 (qh;b;t)] " = Uh;b;t   uh;t+1 (9.8)
The second order condition is satised if
 z0 (qh;b;t) [1  uh;t+1   t+1]  " [2z0 (qh;b;t)  z1 (qh;b;t)] < 0:
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If 2z0 (qh;b;t) > z1 (qh;b;t) ; i.e. if 2 > qh;b;t then the inequality is satised irrespective of ": If
2 < qh;b;t then we need " < (1  uh;t+1   t+1) = (qh;b;t   2) : The expression on the right hand
side is positive. Since " is assumed to be positive but su¢ ciently small the inequality is satised;
hence the SOC holds.
It follows that
b;t = 1  uh;t+1   [z0 (qh;b;t) + z1 (qh;b;t)] (1  uh;t+1   t+1) + qh;b;tz1 (qh;b;t) " (9.9)
Now consider xed price sellers. Recall that they attract low types only, i.e. Uh;f;t < Uh;t and Ul;f;t =
Ul;t; hence qh;f;t = 0 and ql;f;t > 0: Substituting qh;f;t = 0 into f;t, given by (9.4), yields
f;t = 1  ul;t+1   z0 (ql;f;t) [1  ul;t+1   t+1]  ql;f;t (Ul;f;t   ul;t+1)
The seller solves maxql;f;t2R+ f;t s.t. Ul;f;t (rb;t) = Ul;t. The FOC is given by
z0 (ql;f;t) [1  ul;t+1   t+1] = Ul;f;t   ul;t+1: (9.10)
The SOC is trivial; hence the solution corresponds to a maximum. It follows that
f;t = 1  ul;t+1   [z0 (ql;f;t) + z1 (ql;f;t)] (1  ul;t+1   t+1) (9.11)
Recall that 'f;t denotes the fraction of sellers who compete with xed pricing. Substituting qh;f;t =
ql;b;t = 0 into the feasibility conditions in (13) yields
ql;f;t = tt='f;t and qh;b;t = (1  t)t=
 
1  'f;t

:
We will show that there exists a unique 'f;t 2 (0; t) satisfying the equal prot condition f;t = b;t;
proving the equilibrium exists and it is unique. Let ('f;t)  b;t   f;t and note that  rises
in qh;b;t, which in turn rises in 'f;t; and that  falls in ql;f;t; which in turn falls in 'f;t: It follows
that d=d'f;t > 0: Furthermore note that (t) > 0 as uh;t+1 > ul;t+1 (from the inductive step)
whereas (0) < 0 if " is small. To see why, note that (0) < 0 if " < "; where
"  (uh;t+1 ul;t+1)qz1(q) +
1+q
q2
[1  uh;t+1   t+1] ; and q  (1  t)t: (9.12)
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The expression for " is positive. Since " is positive but su¢ ciently small the inequality " < " holds.
Since (0) < 0; (t) > 0 and  is rising in 'f;t; by the Intermediate Value Theorem there exits
a unique 'f;t 2 (0; t) satisfying ('f;t) = 0: Since 'f;t < t we have qh;b;t < t < ql;f;t i.e. xed
price rms are more crowded than exible rms.
Now we can obtain equilibrium prices and payo¤s. Substituting ql;b;t = 0 into the expression
for Uh;b;t; given by (9.2), yields
Uh;b;t =
1 z0(qh;b;t)
qh;b;t
(1  rb;t   uh;t+1) + z0(qh;b;t) (rb;t + "  yt) + uh;t+1:
Solving Uh;b;t = Uh;t, where Uh;t is given by (9.8), for rb;t yields the expression for rb;t; which is
on display in Proposition 3 (equation ((21))). Similarly substituting qh;f;t = 0 into Ul;f;t; given
by (9.2), and solving the equation Ul;f;t = Ul;t, where Ul;t is given by (9.10), for rf;t yields the
expression for rf;t (equation (20)). Equilibrium payo¤s t; uh;t and ul;t are immediate from the
rst order conditions (9.8) and (9.10). Finally the equilibrium bargained price yt is obtained by
substituting uh;t+1 into (1).
High type buyers bargain if yt  rb;t+": After substituting for rb;t and yt and re-arranging this
condition is equivalent to
  ~t  z1(q

h;b;t)
1 z0(qh;b;t)  
"z1(qh;b;t)q

h;b;t
[1 z0(qh;b;t)][1 uh;t+1 t+1+"]
:
If  < ~t then even high types would not opt for bargaining; thus the availability of bargaining
becomes immaterial and the model collapses to a xed price setting, characterized earlier (Eq-FP).
Transact Now or Wait? We have already established that players are better o¤ trading imme-
diately along Eq-FP (see Case 1 above). What remains to be done is to establish this claim for the
other outcome, i.e. Eq-FS. Along this equilibrium high types shop at exible stores and low types
shop at xed price stores. Start with exible stores. The worst case scenario for a high type buyer
is to purchase at rb;t (the alternative is buying at the bargained price y

t ; which is less than r

b;t):
The buyer purchases if 1   rb;t > uh;t+1: After substituting for rb;t the condition is equivalent to
" < Q; where
Q  (1  uh;t+1   t+1) 1 qh;b;t 1+ :
Notice that Q is positive. To see why, note that the numerator is positive, but the sign of the
denominator, qh;b;t   1 + , needs inspection. Recall that along Eq-FS we have   ~t and note
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that ~t  z1(qh;b;t)=[1   z0(qh;b;t)]: The expression qh;b;t   1 +  is increasing in ; thus in order to
show that it is positive it su¢ ces to show that qh;b;t   1 + z1(qh;b;t)=[1  z0(qh;b;t)] > 0: It is easy to
verify that this inequality holds true for all values of qh;b;t; which means that q

h;b;t   1 +  is also
positive; thus Q is positive. Since " is positive but small the inequality " < Q holds; hence the
buyer is better o¤ purchasing instead of waiting. (One can show that Q > "; where " is given by
(9.12); thus " < Q as long as " < ":)
Now consider the seller, whose worst case scenario is selling at yt . The seller agrees to trade if
yt > t+1: Substituting for yt the condition is equivalent to (1  ) [1  uh;t+1   t+1 + "] > 0:
Both expressions are positive; thus the inequality holds.
Now consider a xed price rms, where low types shop. A low type buyer purchases if 1 rf;t >
ul;t+1. After substituting for rf;t the condition is equivalent to
(1  ul;t+1   t+1) z1(ql;f;t)=[1  z0(ql;f;t)] > 0:
Since 1  ul;t+1   t+1 > 0 the inequality holds: Similarly the seller trades if rf;t > t+1; i.e. if
(1  ul;t+1   t+1) [1  z1(ql;f;t)=[1  z0(ql;f;t)]] > 0
Expressions inside the brackets are positive; hence the inequality holds. This completes the proof.

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9.2 Model with N  2 Types of Buyers
In the main text buyers are divided into two types according to their bargaining abilities. Here
we consider a setting with N types, where type 1 buyers are the the least skilled in bargaining
("non-hagglers) and type N buyers are the most skilled. Our goal is to check if the results in the
main text remain robust to this variation. As this exercise is a robustness check, rather than a
full blown analysis, we focus on the one shot game with " = 0 and then elaborate on what would
happen if " < 0 or " > 0:
The Outcome of Bargaining. Letting i 2 [0; 1) denote the bargaining power of type
i = 1; 2; ::N buyers, we x 1 = 0 and assume that negotiation skills increase in i, that is i+1 > i:
As in the benchmark, bargaining may ensue only if there is a single customer at the store. If two
or more customers are present then the item is necessarily sold at the list price. Furthermore we
assume that a buyers negotiation skill manifests itself at the bargaining table, i.e. once negotiations
start the seller can tell how skilled his customer is and correctly identify the parameter i. Notice
that identifying who is the most/least skilled among multiple customers is not an issue as the item
is sold at the posted price under that contingency. Consider the negotiation process between a
seller and a type i buyer. The bargained price yi can be found as the solution to the following
maximization problem:
max
yi2[0;1]
(1  yi)i y1 ii
The solution yields yi = 1   i. Since i+1 > i we have yi+1 < yi; i.e. higher types bargain
lower prices. Since 1 = 0, type 1 never bargains. We assume that 2 is su¢ ciently large to ensure
that rb  y2; i.e. type 2 buyers are skilled enough to obtain a lower price than the posted price.
(Otherwise the model collapses to a setting with N   1 types, where type 1 and type 2 buyers are
the non-hagglers.) Clearly, if type 2 is skilled enough to ask for bargaining then the higher types
(3; 4; ::; N) are more than capable of doing so.
Expected Payo¤s. Let qi;m denote the expected demand consisting of type i buyers at a store
trading via rule m and let
qm 
NX
i=1
qi;m; where m = f; b and i = 1; 2; ::; N
denote the total demand at that store. It follows that the expected utility of a type i buyer at a
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xed price store is given by
Ui;f =
1  z0 (qf )
qf
(1  rf ) ; for i = 1; 2; ::; N:
At a exible store, on the other hand, we have
U1;b =
1  z0 (qb)
qb
(1  rb) and
Ui;b = z0 (qb) (1  yi) +
1X
n=1
zn (qb)
n+ 1
(1  rb) ; i = 2; 3:::N:
The rst line is the expected utility of a type 1 buyer (they never negotiate), whereas the second
line is the expected utility of a type i buyer, who would negotiate if he is the sole customer at
the store. These expressions are similar to their counterparts in the baseline model and can be
interpreted similarly. Basic algebra reveals that
Ui;b = U1;b + z0 (qb) (rb   yi) and Ui+1;b = Ui;b + z0 (qb) (yi   yi+1) for i = 2; 3; ::N (9.13)
Since rb > y2 and yi > yi+1 we have Ui+1;b > Ui;b: Now turn to sellers. A xed price seller expects
to earn
f = [1  z0 (qf )] rf :
The expression for f is the same as its counterpart in the benchmark model; however exible
sellersexpected prot is slightly more cumbersome, because they face the prospect of meeting all
types of customers and each type negotiates a di¤erent price. We have
b =
NX
i=2
NY
j=1;j 6=i
z0 (qj;b) z1 (qi;b) yi +
24 NY
j=2
z0 (qj;b) z1 (q1;b) +
1X
n=2
zn (qb)
35 rb
To understand the rst term note that with probability
NY
j=1;j 6=i
z0 (qj;b) z1 (qi;b) the seller gets exactly
one type i customer, in which case he charges the bargained price yi (recall that the seller can
identify the type of the customer during the negotiation process): To account for all types, the
expression needs to be summed over all i; but the summation starts from i = 2 because type 1
customers never negotiate. The second expression inside the brackets represent the probability of
getting exactly one type 1 customer or getting more than one customer, regardless of the type.
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In either case the seller charges the posted price rb: Noting that
NY
j=1
z0 (qj;b) = z0 (qb) and that
xz0 (x) = z1 (x) one can show that
m = 1  z0 (qm) 
NX
i=1
qi;mUi;m; where m = f; b:
Now we can state the main result of this section.
Proposition 7 If N    z1 () = [1  z0 ()] then there exists a continuum of equilibria, where
an indeterminate fraction '  max f1; 2; :::; Ng of sellers trade via xed pricing and remaining
sellers trade via exible pricing. The equilibria are characterized by partial segmentation: Everyone
but type N customers shop exclusively at xed price rms whereas type N customers shop anywhere.
The expected demand at each store equals to : Fixed and exible price sellers post, respectively
rf () = 1 
z1 ()
1  z0 () and r

b () = 1 
z1 () (1  N )
1  z0 ()  z1 ()
The equilibria are payo¤-equivalent: in any realized equilibrium sellers and buyers earn  = 1  
z0 () z1 () and u = z0 () no matter which rule sellers compete with and no matter which sellers
rule buyers join in. If N < , i.e. if type N customers are not skilled enough in negotiations
then the availability of exible pricing becomes immaterial and xed pricing emerges as the unique
equilibrium.
The proposition largely resembles its counterpart in the main text (Proposition 1), which in-
dicates that the results remain rather robust. The key insight in here is that competition among
sellers dictates bargaining deals to be designated for the most skilled type, which is why in equilib-
rium only the most skilled negotiators hunt for bargaining deals and everyone else shops at xed
price venues. An outcome where a rm attracts two di¤erent types of customers fails to exist, be-
cause along that scenario the lower type ends up with a lower market utility, which is incompatible
with prot maximization under competition. An outcome where a rm caters exclusively to a lesser
type fails to exist for similar reasons.
In what follows we prove the proposition. Steps 1, 2 and 3, reminiscent of Lemma 2 in the main
text, establish how customer demographics pan out along a competitive search equilibrium. We,
then, characterize the equilibrium.
 Step 1. A exible store cannot attract two (or more) di¤erent types of customers at the same
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time. It must be attracting a single type only.
We will show that the store cannot attract two di¤erent types at the same time. The fact that
it cannot attract more than two types is a corollary. To start, suppose, by contradiction, a exible
store attracts types k and k+1; i.e. suppose that qk;b and qk+1;b are both positive whereas qi;b = 0
for all i 6= k; k + 1. The fact that qk;b and qk+1;b are both positive implies that Uk;b = Uk and
Uk+1;b = Uk+1: Recall that Uk+1;b > Uk;b: It follows that Uk+1 > Uk: In addition the fact that
qk+j = 0; where j  2; implies that Uk+j;b < Uk+j : Since Uk+j;b > Uk;b = Uk we have Uk+j > Uk:
In words all types who are better negotiators than type k must have a higher market utility than
type k: The sellers prot equals to
b = 1  z0 (qk;b + qk+1;b)  qk;bUk;b   qk+1;bUk+1;b
= 1  z0 (qk;b + qk+1;b)  (qk;b + qk+1;b)Uk;b  ;
where  := qk+1;bz0 (qk;b + qk+1;b) (yk   yk+1) > 0: The second line follows from (9.13) and note
that  is positive because yk > yk+1:
Below we show that if this seller switches from exible pricing to xed pricing and provides
his customers with market utility Uk then he could keep his expected demand intact yet he would
earn higher prots, rendering the above outcome a non-equilibrium. To start, note that if the
seller switches to xed pricing then all buyers, regardless of their bargaining ability, earn the same
expected payo¤
Uf =
1  z0 (qf )
qf
(1  rf )
at his rm. If the seller provides customers with market utility Uk then types k+1 and above will
not visit that store because Uk+j > Uk for all j  1 (see above): It follows that the seller will be
visited by types k or below. The fact that the seller provides his customers with market utility Uk
implies that Uf = Uk: Recall that Uk;b = Uk: It follows Uf = Uk;b; i.e
 =
1  z0 (qf )
qf
(1  rf )  1  z0 (qb)
qb
(1  rb)  z0 (qb) (rb   yk) = 0:
Fix rb and qb and note that, per the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exits a unique r^f 2 (0; rb)
ensuring that qf = qb while satisfying  = 0: In words if the seller posts r^f then he can provide his
customers with market utility Uk while keeping his expected demand intact. Recall that his prior
expected demand was qb; by posting r^f the seller ensures that his new expected demand qf is the
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same as qb:
The sellers expected prot under xed pricing is equal to f = 1 z0 (qf ) qfUf : Since qb = qf
it is easy to show that f   b =  > 0; i.e. the seller earns higher prots than he did before;
hence the initial outcome could not be an equilibrium. This completes the proof. 
Step 1 establishes that a exible store can only attract a single type. This raises the question
of whether a exible store attracts, say, type k while another exible store attracts type k+ 1: I.e.
whether a separating equilibrium where di¤erent exible stores attract di¤erent types could exist.
Below we rule out this possibility.
 Step 2. There cannot be an outcome where di¤erent exible stores attract di¤erent types of
customers. All exible stores must attract the same type.
Consider two exible stores, say store A and B. Suppose store A attracts type k only store B
attracts type k+1 only (Step 1 ruled out the possibility of a store attracting more than one type).
So for store A we have qAk > 0 and q
A
i = 0 for all i 6= k and for store B we have qBk+1 > 0 and
qBi = 0 for all i 6= k + 1:
Note that type k + 1 could shop at store A and obtain a better deal than type k as they are
more skilled; but the fact that they stay away from store A indicates that their market utility is
higher, i.e. Uk+1 > Uk: Technically at store A we have UAk;b = Uk: The fact that q
A
k+1 = 0 indicates
that UAk+1;b < Uk+1: Recall that U
A
k+1;b > U
A
k;b: It follows that Uk+1 > Uk:
Store A solves
max
qAk;b2R+
Ab = max
qAk;b2R+
1  z0
 
qAk;b
  qAk;bUAk;b s.t. UAk;b = Uk
The FOC implies z0(qAk;b) = Uk; hence
Ab = 1  z0
 
qAk;b
  z1  qAk;b :
Store Bs problem is similar, thus
Bb = 1  z0
 
qBk+1;b
  z1  qBk+1;b :
Stores must earn equal prots; thus Ab = 
B
b : This implies that q
A
k;b = q
B
k+1;b; which in turn implies
that Uk = Uk+1; a contradiction. 
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 Step 3. Flexible stores must be attracting type N only.
Suppose they attract some other type, say type k < N . The fact that type k buyers visit
exible stores while type N buyers stay away indicates that UN;b < UN and Uk;b = Uk. Recall
that UN;b > Uk;b, thus UN > Uk: Since type N buyers stay away from exible rms, they must be
shopping at xed price rms. This means that UN;f = UN : Recall however that Ui;f is the same for
all i; thus Uk;f = UN;f : It follows that Uk;f > Uk; a contradiction since by denition Uk;f cannot
exceed the market utility Uk. 
Characterization of Equilibrium. Flexible stores attract no one but type N; i.e. qN;b > 0 and
qi;b = 0 for all i 6= N: It follows that
b = 1  z0 (qN;b)  qN;bUN;b
A exible seller solves
max
qN;b2R+
1  z0 (qN;b)  qN;bUN;b s.t. UN;b = UN
The FOC implies z0 (qN;b) = UN ; hence
b = 1  z0 (qN;b)  z1 (qN;b) :
The fact that exible stores attract no one but type N indicates that types 1; 2; :::; N   1 must be
shopping at xed price stores. So, let qf =
PN
i=1 qi;f denote the total demand of a xed price store
consisting of type 1; 2; :::; N   1, and possibly of type N , customers. The xed price seller solves
max
qf2R+
1  z0 (qf )  qfUf s.t. Uf = U;
where U is a generic level or market utility (as it turns out this will be equal to UN ): The FOC is
given by z0 (qf ) = U . The sellers prot, therefore, is equal to
f = 1  z0 (qf )  z1 (qf ) :
Both sellers must earn equal prots; i.e. b = f : This indicates that qN;b = qf , i.e. expected
demands at xed and exible stores must be identical. This means that U = UN ; indicating that
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all buyers must earn the same market utility and that type N , too, may shop at xed price stores
i.e. qN;f may indeed be positive. Letting 'f denote the fraction of xed price sellers and i the
fraction of type i buyers in the market, with
PN
i=1 i = 1; we have
'fqi;f + (1  'f )qi;b = i for i = 1; 2; ::; N:
The feasibility condition is similar to its counterpart in the main text (compare with (13)). Noting
that qi;b = 0 for i < N we have
'f
NX
i=1
qi;f| {z }
qf
+
 
1  'f

qN;b = 
NX
i=1
i = :
Recall that qf = qN;b; hence
qN;b = ; q

N;f =
(N   1 + 'f )
'f
; qi;f =
i
'f
for i < N:
Note that for any 'f  max f1; 2; :::; Ng   expected demands qi;f are positive and satisfy the
relationship above. This means that 'f is indeterminate and we have a continuum of equilibria
where 'f 2 [; 1]. Note that if 'f   then
PN
i=1 q

i;f = q

N;b = ; i.e. in any given equilibrium
exible sellers and xed price sellers have the same expected demand : To complete the proof
we need to pin down the equilibrium payo¤s and prices; but this is a rather mechanic task and it
can be accomplished by going through the steps outlined in the proof of Proposition 1; hence it is
skipped here. 
What if " 6= 0? First, if " < 0 then, as in the benchmark, no seller would o¤er exible pricing.
To see why, notice that if " = 0 then sellers are indi¤erent between xed and exible pricing. If,
however, " falls below zero then this indi¤erence would no longer hold because the negative " would
lter into exible sellersprots causing them to earn less than xed price stores. Sellers can avoid
this negative e¤ect by switching to xed pricing. This claim can be proved by repeating the steps
in the proof of Proposition 2 because the key in that proof is the fact that a negative " hurts
exible sellersprots, which would remain true irrespective of whether there are two or N types
of customers.
If " > 0 then we expect Proposition 3 to go through with the above caveat that exible stores
attract type N customers and that everyone else shops at xed price stores. To establish this claim
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one needs to prove Steps that are analogous to Step 1, 2 and 3 above. A close look at their proofs
reveals that the key factor driving the results is the inequality Ui+1;b > Ui;b the fact that higher
types earn more at a bargaining store than lower types. With " > 0 expected utilities Ui;b would
have di¤erent closed form expressions, but, nevertheless the inequality Ui+1;b > Ui;b would remain
as the parameter " is orthogonal to the bargaining ability i. As such, the claims in Steps 1, 2
and 3 would go through even if " > 0: Once customer demographics are settled (that exible stores
attract type N customers and xed price stores attract everyone else), the characterization of the
equilibrium can, then, be accomplished by virtually repeating the same steps as in the proof of
Proposition 3.
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9.3 Second Round Matching
In the main text buyers who are unable to get an o¤er from, a rm or rms who are unable to receive
a customer need to wait until the next trading period before they can try again. Here we study a
variation where unmatched players may be costlessly re-matched with trading counterparts before
moving to the next period a process to which we refer as second round matching. In what follows
we reconstruct the equilibria under this modication and show that the results of the benchmark
model remain unchanged, subject to a modication in outside options. Since this exercise is a
robustness check rather than a full blown analysis, we analyze the case " = 0 in detail and then
elaborate on what would happen if " < 0 or " > 0:
We assume that in each trading period two rounds of meetings take place. The rst one is the
matching process in the benchmark model. At the end of this round, inevitably, some buyers and
sellers remain unmatched, so these players costlessly enter into a second round, where they are
randomly matched with one another. One can specify a number of ways on how this may work, but
to keep things simple and tractable we remain agnostic about the matching process, and simply
assume that each buyer, regardless of his type, gets to trade with probability !B;t whereas each
seller, regardless of whether he was xed or exible with the list price, gets to trade with probability
!S;t: The key observation is that, even in the second round players are not guaranteed to trade,
i.e. the matching function may assign multiple buyers to a seller, in which case some buyers will be
unable to buy, or it may assign no buyers to a seller, in which case the seller will have no choice but
to wait for the next period. For now we take !B;t and !S;t as given, but at the end of this section
we show how they might be tied to the fundamentals of the model, for example, via a standard
urn-ball matching function.
Another issue that needs to be addressed is how the transaction in the second round is settled.
This can be done in a number of ways, e.g. a fty-fty split, trading at the initially posted price and
so on. Again, we remain agnostic about this mechanism, and instead assume that after a transaction
in the second round the seller obtains payo¤ pt 2 [pt; pt] and the buyer obtains 1  pt: For now we
take the boundaries of pt as given but subsequently they will be pinned down endogenously.
Proposition 8 Fix some pt 2 [t+1; 1  ut+1]. If  > t then there exists a continuum of
equilibria, where an indeterminate fraction 'f;t  t of sellers trade via xed pricing and remaining
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sellers trade via exible pricing. Sellers post
rf;t = 1  B;t  
z1 (t)
1  z0 (t)
 
1  B;t   S;t

rb;t = 1  B;t  
z1 (t) (1  )
1  z0 (t)  z1 (t)
 
1  B;t   S;t

where
B;t = !B;t (1  pt) + (1  !B;t)ut+1 and S;t = !S;tpt + (1  !S;t)t+1
In case negotiations ensue transaction occurs at price
yt = 1  B;t   
 
1  B;t   S;t

The expected demand at each store equals to t; however the equilibria are characterized by partial
segmentation of customers: non-hagglers shop exclusively at xed price rms whereas hagglers shop
anywhere. In any equilibrium sellers and buyers earn
t = 1  B;t   [z0 (t) + z1 (t)]
 
1  B;t   S;t

ut = z0 (t)

1  B;t   S;t

+ B;t:
If  < t then xed pricing emerges as the unique equilibrium: all sellers post rf;t and serve both
types of customers. The total demand at each rm equals to t and the equilibrium payo¤s remain
the same as above.
In the main text a buyers outside option is ut+1; which is the present value of his expected
payo¤ in the next period:With the prospect of second round meetings, his outside option is B;t =
!B;t (1  pt) + (1  !B;t)ut+1; which is a weighted average: with probability !B;t the buyer gets
to trade in the second round and obtains 1 pt and with the complementary probability 1 !B;t he
is unable to trade even in the second round, so he walks away with ut+1. Sellersoutside option
S;t can be interpreted similarly. A comparison between this proposition and its counterpart in the
main text, Proposition 1, reveals that they are virtually identical if one updates the outside options
with their current form in here, which indicates that the results remain robust.
The second round meeting gives customers and rms another chance to transact without incur-
ring additional costs, as such, it diminishes trade frictions and improves everyones outside options
(one can show that B;t > ut+1 and S;t > t+1). This e¤ect is similar to raising the discount
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factor in the benchmark model: Indeed in the benchmark model ut+1 and t+1 can be improved
simultaneously by raising ; which lowers waiting costs for everyone and renders trade frictions less
biting.
An important question is whether players would like to trade immediately rather than waiting.
Although we address this issue more technically in the proof of the proposition, the answer is yes
both in the rst round as well as in the second round players are better o¤ transacting whenever
they have an opportunity to do so. Recall that in the second round buyers get payo¤ 1   pt and
sellers get pt: The fact that pt 2 [t+1; 1  ut+1] ensures that both the rms and their customers
are willing to trade during the second round meetings instead of waiting for the next period. If pt
falls outside these boundaries then either the rm or the customer will walk away, rendering second
round meetings immaterial and causing the model to collapses to its version in the main text.
The crucial question is, then, whether players would want to transact in the rst round instead
of waiting for the second round. The answer is, still yes. Trade frictions may be lessened by the
prospect of second round meetings, but they are not completely wiped out as no one is guaranteed
to a sure trade, and therefore players are better o¤ trading immediately instead of waiting. It is
worth pointing out that the prospect of second round meetings lters into the equilibrium objects,
i.e. the prices and payo¤s are determined taking into consideration the the new version of outside
options, which convinces buyers and sellers to trade at those prices instead of waiting.
As mentioned above, the analysis is based on the case " = 0; however given the results so far
we can speculate on what would happen if " > 0 or " < 0: A detailed comparison between the
proof of Proposition 8 and the proof of its counterpart in the main text, Proposition 1, reveals that
both proofs follow virtually identical steps if one replaces the outside options in the benchmark
with their current form. The parameter " is orthogonal to the determination of outside options, as
such we expect Propositions 2 and 3 , which correspond to cases " < 0 and " > 0; to go through in
similar fashion.
Proof of Proposition 8. The proof is by induction; however the analysis of the terminal
period is quite similar to the analysis of the inductive step; hence skipping it we directly analyze
the inductive step pertaining period t:
Bargaining. The Nash product in this version of the model is given by
max
yt2[0;1]
 
1  yt   B;t
  
yt   S;t
1 
:
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The solution yields
yt = 1  B;t   
 
1  B;t   S;t

:
We assume that yt < rb;t; which requires  to be su¢ ciently large, i.e. hagglers have su¢ cient
bargaining power to negotiate the list price.
Expected payo¤. We construct an equilibrium under the conjecture that non hagglers shop at
xed price stores whereas hagglers shop at both types of stores. Furthermore we conjecture that
players transact immediately instead of waiting. We will verify both of these conjectures once we
pin down equilibrium prices and payo¤s. Along our conjecture, the expected utility of a high type
buyer, who shops at a best o¤er store, is given by
Uh;b;t = z0 (qh;b;t) (1  yt) + 1  z0 (qh;b;t)  z1 (qh;b;t)
qh;b;t
(1  rb;t) + qh;b;t   1 + z0 (qh;b;t)
qh;b;t
B;t: (9.14)
With probability z0 (qh;b;t) the buyer is alone at the store and purchases the item through nego-
tiations at price yt: With probability zn (qh;b;t) he encounters n = 1; 2; :: other buyers, and his
probability of being able to buy is
1X
n=1
zn (qh;b;t)
n+ 1
=
1  z0 (qh;b;t)  z1 (qh;b;t)
qh;b;t
:
If he manages to purchase, then he pays the list price rb;t: Finally with the complementary prob-
ability he is unable to buy in the rst round, so he obtains B;t: A exible sellers prot is given
by
b;t = z1 (qh;b;t) yt + [1  z0 (qh;b;t)  z1 (qh;b;t)] rb;t + z0 (qh;b;t)S;t
If there is a single customer then the transaction occurs at price yt; if there are more than one
customer then the transaction occurs at rb;t and if the seller does not get a customer then he
obtains S;t: Given the expression for Uh;b;t we can rewrite the prot function as follows
b;t = 1  z0 (qh;b;t)  qh;b;tUh;b;t + [qh;b;t   1 + z0 (qh;b;t)]B;t + z0 (qh;b;t)S;t:
Now consider a xed price store. Letting qf;t  qh;f;t + ql;f;t denote the total expected demand,
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both types of buyers obtain the same expected utility at the xed price store, where
Uh;f;t = Ul;f;t  Uf;t = 1  z0 (qf;t)
qf;t
(1  rf;t) + qf;t   1 + z0 (qf;t)
qf;t
B;t: (9.15)
The expression is similar to Uh;b;t except for the fact that the transaction occurs at the xed price
rf;t even if there is a single customer at the store: A xed price sellers prot is equal to
f;t = [1  z0 (qf;t)] rf;t + z0 (qf;t)S;t;
which can be rewritten as
f;t = 1  z0 (qf;t)  qf;tUf;t + [qf;t   1 + z0 (qf;t)]B;t + z0 (qf;t)S;t:
Characterization of the Equilibrium. Recall that non hagglers shop at xed price stores whereas
hagglers shop at both types of stores. This means that Ul;f;t = Ul;t and Uh;f;t = Uh;b;t = Uh;t: Since
Uh;f;t = Ul;f;t we have Uh;t = Ul;t  Ut. A exible seller maximizes b;t subject to Uh;b;t = Ut.
Substituting the constraint into the objective function, the rst order condition is given by
z0 (qh;b;t)  Ut + [1  z0 (qh;b;t)]B;t   z0 (qh;b;t)S;t = 0:
It follows that
b;t = 1  z0 (qh;b;t)  z1 (qh;b;t)  [1  z0 (qh;b;t)  z1 (qh;b;t)]B;t + [z0 (qh;b;t) + z1 (qh;b;t)]S;t:
Similarly a xed price seller maximizes f;t subject to Uf;t = Ut: The rst order condition is given
by
z0 (qf;t)  Ut + [1  z0 (qf;t)]B;t   z0 (qf;t)S;t = 0;
which implies that
f;t = 1  z0 (qf;t)  z1 (qf;t)  [1  z0 (qf;t)  z1 (qf;t)]B;t + [z0 (qf;t) + z1 (qf;t)]S;t:
In equilibrium sellers must earn equal prots, i.e. f;t = b;t; thus qh;b;t = qf;t = qh;f;t + ql;f;t: It
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follows that
qh;b;t = t; qh;f;t = t('

f;t   t)='f;t and ql;f;t = tt='f;t;
where 'f;t denotes the equilibrium fraction of xed price sellers. Note that, '

f;t is indeterminate in
that any value within [t; 1] satises the equalities above; hence, there is a continuum of equilibria
where any fraction 'f;t  t of sellers compete via xed pricing while the rest compete via exible
pricing. Notice, however, in any equilibrium, the total expected demand at each rm equals to t:
Now we can obtain expressions for equilibrium prices. Combining the rst order condition of
exible sellers with indi¤erence constraint Uh;b;t = Ut yields
z0 (t) + [1  z0 (t)]B;t   z0 (t)S;t = Uh;b;t;
where Uh;b;t is given by (9.14). Solving this equality for rb;t yields the expression for rb;t in the body
of the proposition. The equilibrium xed price rf;t is obtained likewise. The rst order condition
of xed price sellers along with the indi¤erence constraint Uf;t = Uh;t implies
z0 (t) + [1  z0 (t)]B;t   z0 (t)S;t = Uf;t
where Uf;t is given by (9.15). Solving this equality for rf;t yields the expression for rf;t in the body
of the proposition. High type buyers negotiate if rb;t  yt ; which, after substituting for rb;t and yt ,
is equivalent to   t = z1 (t) = [1  z0 (t)] : Given the expressions for rf;t and rb;t one can verify
that the equilibrium payo¤s are as follows b;t = f;t = t and Uh;b;t = Uf;t  ut, where t and ut
are given in the body of the proposition.
If  < t then rb;t < yt; thus no bargaining takes place as the list price r

b;t is already below the
bargained price yt . As in the benchmark model, in this parameter region, the model collapses to a
xed-price setting.
Proof of Conjecture 1: Players transact immediately rather than waiting.
If pt 2 [t+1; 1  ut+1] then sellers and buyers would be willing to trade in the second round
instead of waiting for the next period. Indeed if pt  t+1 then the seller is better o¤ transacting
at pt instead of waiting for period t+ 1 and obtaining t+1: Similarly if pt  1  ut+1 then the
buyer is better o¤ purchasing instead of waiting for the next period and getting ut+1:
Now consider the rst round. It is straightforward to show that if   t then rb;t > rf;t > yt :
From a sellersperspective the worst case scenario is transacting at yt , which is the lowest price.
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Similarly for a buyer the worst case scenario is purchasing at rb;t. If they agree to transact under
these worst case scenarios then they would agree to transact under more favorable prices.
Consider a buyer who contemplates buying at rb;t: He would transact if 1   rb;t  B;t; i.e. if
his immediate surplus 1  rb;t exceeds his outside option B;t associated with walking away at the
end of of round 1. Basic algebra reveals that this inequality is satised if
z1(t)(1 )
1 z0(t) z1(t)
 
1  B;t   S;t

> 0:
The left hand side is positive; hence the inequality holds: Now consider a seller, whose worst case
scenario is selling at yt : The seller transacts if yt  S;t; i.e. if his immediate surplus yt exceeds
his outside option S;t associated with walking away at the end of round 1. Basic algebra reveals
that this inequality is satised if
(1  )  1  B;t   S;t > 0:
Again, both expressions are positive; hence the seller, too, is willing to transact immediately.
Proof of Conjecture 2. Low types strictly prefer xed price stores and high types are indi¤erent.
A low types expected utility at a best o¤er store is given by
Ul;b;t =
1 z0(t)
t

1  rb;t

+ t 1+z0(t)t B;t
Substituting for rb;t it is easy to show if  > t then Ul;b;t < ut; conrming indeed that low types
are better o¤ staying away from best o¤er stores. To show that high types are indi¤erent between
xed and exible stores we need to show that along the equilibrium path we have Uh;b;t = Uf;t:
Substituting rb;t and r

f;t it is a matter of basic algebra to verify that indeed this equality holds,
conrming the validity of the conjecture. This completes the proof of the proposition. 
Matching Function. Here we show how !S;t and !B;t may derived from the fundamentals
of the model if one assumes that second round meetings are governed by "urn-ball matching",
where all unmatched buyers (balls) and all unmatched sellers (urns) enter into a random matching
process (see Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)). Matching frictions are due to the random nature
of the process some urns receive several balls and others none. Given the process one can pin
down the probabilities !B;t and !S;t as follows: Along the equilibrium outlined in the Proposition,
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at the end of the rst round st (1  z0 (t)) sellers are matched. Players transact immediately and
each transaction takes one buyer and one seller. This implies that bt   st (1  z0 (t)) buyers and
stz0 (t) sellers are not matched.18 The buyer-seller ratio in the second round is equal to
0t =
bt   st (1  z0 (t))
stz0 (t)
=
t   1 + z0 (t)
z0 (t)
:
The second equation follows from the fact that st = btt: An unmatched sellers chance of being
able to transact, !S;t; is equal to the probability of meeting at least a buyer, i.e.
!S;t = 1  z0
 
0t

:
Similarly, an unmatched buyers chance of transacting in the second round is equal to
!B;t =
1X
n=0
zn
 
0t

n+ 1
=
1  z0
 
0t

0t
:
With probability zn
 
0t

he encounters n = 0; 1; 2; ::: other buyers there (recall that due to ran-
domness of the process a seller may get more than one buyer), in which case he has a probability
of 1n+1 obtaining the item (each buyer has an equal chance). The second equality follows from the
facts that zn+1 (x) =
xzn(x)
n+1 and that
P1
n=0 zn (x) = 1: Notice that if 
0
t > 1 then !S;t > !B;t; i.e. if
there are more buyers in the pool than sellers, then a seller is more likely to meet a trading partner
than a buyer. The opposite is true if 0t < 1.
9.4 SellersImplementation Cost of Bargaining
In our model rms do not incur any implementation costs to sell via bargaining. However given
the results on how the nature of equilibria respond to " we can predict what would happen if sellers
were to incur such a cost. Recall that if " = 0 then both pricing rules are payo¤ equivalent and
sellers are indi¤erent to pick either xed pricing or exible pricing. If, however, " turns negative
then the payo¤ equivalence breaks down and xed pricing emerges as the unique outcome. From
sellerspoint of view the negative " is an indirect cost. It is incurred by buyers, but nevertheless
it bleeds into the sellersprot functions and thereby induces them to switch to xed pricing. The
18The payo¤ in the second round is the same for all buyers, thus we do not need to keep track of high and low
types during this process. As an aside, note that along the equilibrium in Proposition 8 high and low types trade at
the same rate; thus, the ratio of high types to low types remains intact among unmatched buyers. (See the analysis
in the main text for a formal proof for this argument.)
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implication is that if an indirect cost can disturb the payo¤ equivalence between xed and exible
pricing then a direct cost will result in the same outcome, i.e. introducing a cost of implementing
bargaining into the setting " = 0 would cause exible sellers to earn less, and thereby, lead to a
xed price equilibrium. Needless to say, introducing such a cost into a setting with " < 0 will only
reinforce the xed price outcome.
If, however, " > 0 then the outcome is less clear because along Eq-FS sellers are able to
convert the positive " into higher prices and, thereby, earn higher prots compared to a xed
price equilibrium. So, if one inserts an implementation cost into the framework with " > 0 then
whether or not sellers would revert back to xed pricing depends on how this cost compares with the
di¤erence in prots. If the cost is prohibitively large then we would expect a xed price equilibrium
to emerge and if the cost is su¢ ciently small then Eq-FS should survive, albeit with fewer exible
stores (compared to the benchmark model with no cost).
9.5 Game with Innite Horizon
In our model the market runs for a nite number of periods, i.e. T < 1: Under this specica-
tion one can solve the model recursively by substituting the terminal payo¤s uT+1 = T+1 = 0
into the equilibrium conditions to obtain payo¤s for period T; which then can be substituted to
obtain payo¤s for period T   1; and so on. The method is straightforward, but more importantly,
one does not need to worry about how market demand uctuates over time, driven by the tuple
fbnewt ; snewt ; newt gTt=2 :
If T =1 then one can prove existence of equilibrium and analytically characterize a solution if
the market exhibits some cyclicality, i.e. if agents face the same outlook, say, every k periods. The
cyclical nature of the model would allow us to prove analogous versions of Propositions 1, 2 and
3 using induction and then, again, exploiting cyclicality we can pin down equilibrium payo¤s and
prices. As an example focus on the setting with " = 0 and consider the simplest possible scenario
where the environment is fully stationary in that outgoing agents are replaced by incoming agents
one for one. With perfect replacement the number of buyers and sellers, and therefore the expected
demand t; remains constant at all times. Since players face the same market outlook irrespective
of the calendar time, equilibrium payo¤s t and ut; and thereby, equilibrium prices are also time
independent, which allows us to solve the model analytically. (To prove existence of the equilibrium
one needs to virtually repeat the steps outlined in the proof of Proposition 1). Dropping the time
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subscripts from equations (17) and (18), we have
 = 1  u  [z0 () + z1 ()] (1  u  ) and u = z0 () [1  u  ] + u:
This is a simple system with two equations and two unknowns ( and u); which can be solved
easily. Once  and u are pinned down, the equilibrium prices and probabilities readily follow. This
solution concept is rather straightforward, but as t starts to uctuate the system of equations
grows rapidly. For instance if t is high in even periods and low in odd periods then we would have
a system of four equations and four unknowns (odd; even; uodd; ueven) to deal with. In general if
the cycles lasts k periods then one needs to solve a system of 2k equations and unknowns. Needless
to say, as k grows large an analytic solution becomes elusive.
If the model cannot be solved analytically, then one can x T at some large value and pick some
arbitrary values for terminal payo¤s uT+1 and T+1 and solve the model via the aforementioned
recursive method. The solution will be accurate for t << T because, due to discounting, the impact
of terminal payo¤s vanishes if t is su¢ ciently far away from T: Our simulations seemed to conrm
this insight. We xed T = 360,  = 0:95 and ran simulations for a number of arbitrary values of
uT+1 2 [0; 1] and T+1 2 [0; 1] and saw no impact of the terminal payo¤s on equilibrium objects
(prices and payo¤s) for t < 350 or so: Needless to say, the accuracy can be extended by picking a
larger T or a smaller :
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9.6 Endogenous separation of hagglers and non-hagglers
Suppose that buyers are identical in terms of their bargaining skills but they di¤er in terms of their
enjoyment for the bargaining experience, proxied by the parameter ": Imagine that " varies in an
interval [";"], where " < 0 and "  0; and that buyers are divided into N separate groups, where
the fraction of group i is given by i, with
PN
i=1 i = 1: Furthermore, suppose that group 1 has the
lowest " and group N has the highest, that is
"  "1 < "2 < ::: < "N  ":
The following proposition presents the main result along this variation.
Proposition 9 The nature of the equilibria depends on the upper bound "N : There are two cases:
1. If "N = 0 then there exists a continuum of payo¤-equivalent equilibria, where an indetermi-
nate fraction '  1   N of rms trade via xed pricing and remaining rms trade via exible
pricing. The equilibria exhibit partial segmentation in customer demographics: types 1; 2; ::; N   1
shop exclusively at xed price rms whereas type N customers shop anywhere.
2. If "N > 0 and if the gap "N  "N 1 is su¢ ciently large then there exists an equilibrium where
a fraction ' < 1 N of rms trade via xed pricing and remaining rms trade via exible pricing.
The equilibrium exhibits full segmentation of customers: types 1; 2; ::; N 1 shop exclusively at xed
price rms whereas type N customers shop at exible rms.
The equilibrium in item 1 is largely identical to Eq-PS in the main text, which emerges when
" = 0. Similarly, the equilibrium in item 2 is similar to Eq-FS, which exists when " > 0: The
similarities indicate that the results of the main text remain robust under this variation; however
there are some subtleties that we need to point out.
First, sellers designate the bargaining deals only for the most enthusiastic type (type N), which
is why in equilibrium only type N customers hunt for such deals while everyone else shops at xed
price venues. To see why, note that unlike the main text, lower types in here can negotiate a deal
if they are alone at a exible store. But, if they are not alone, then they must pay the inated list
price. As hinted above, the list price is designated for the most enthusiastic type, so it is too high
for everyone else. For lower types, the enjoyment they might get from negotiating a deal (proxied
by their ") is simply not enough to counter-balance the prospect of paying such a high price. Thus,
lower types are better o¤ shopping at xed price venues.
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Second, if "N > 0 then the existence of the equilibrium hinges on the condition of there being a
large enough gap between "N and "N 1. This is to ensure that type N   1 stays away from exible
stores (if type N   1 stays away, then all other types will stay away). In the main text we did not
need such a condition Eqm FS would go through as long as " was positive. The reason is that
in the main text low types were not able to bargain anyway (due to the lack of their bargaining
skills), so we did not need a separate condition on their " to keep them away from exible stores.
Third, unlike the main text, customers in this setting are identical in their bargaining skills, yet
the division of hagglers vs. non-hagglers still emerges as an endogenous phenomenon. Indeed, in
equilibrium customers who enjoy bargaining the most, shop at exible stores and haggle over the
sale price whereas remaining customers shop at xed price stores and do not haggle at all. This
observation suggests that one can potentially do away with the exogenous haggler vs. non-haggler
distinction in the main text, and instead start from a primitive of heterogenous " and still obtain
qualitatively similar results.
The endogenous separation of hagglers vs. non-hagglers is indeed appealing. However, from
an analytical point of view, the setup in the main text with the exogenous distinction of hagglers
vs. non hagglers, has its advantages. First, the setup in the main text allows us to prove existence
and uniqueness of the equilibrium. In here, unfortunately, the proof of uniqueness remains elusive.
(The proposition above claims existence but it does not rule out other scenarios.)
Second, the existence of equilibrium along the current variation hinges on the condition of there
being a large gap between "N and "N 1: If we solve this model in a dynamic setting, then there will
be T similar and recursively related conditions. Analytically characterizing that many conditions
would be impractical and, therefore, it will be down to numerical simulations to conrm whether
an equilibrium exists for a given parameter set.
The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of the proposition. (We focus on a one shot
game, where the search market operates only once, i.e. T = 1:)
Proof of Proposition 9. The proof consists of three steps.
Step 1. Preliminaries. Let qi;m denote the expected demand consisting of type i buyers at a store
trading via rule m and let
qm 
NX
i=1
qi;m; where m = f; b and i = 1; 2; ::; N
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denote the total demand. The expected utility of a type i buyer at a exible store is given by
Ui;b = z0 (qb) (1  y + "i) +
1X
n=1
zn (qb)
n+ 1
(1  rb) ;
where y is the bargained price and rb is the exible list price. Notice that since buyers are equally
skilled in bargaining, they negotiate the same price y when dealing with a exible seller. For the
purpose of the proposition we do not need a closed form solution for y we simply assume that
buyersbargaining power, which pins down the bargained price, is high enough for them to take
advantage of exible deals (else, the model collapses to a xed price setting.)
Basic algebra reveals that
Ui;b = UN;b   z0 (qb) ("N   "i) for i = 1; ::; N
Since "i+1 > "i+1 we have Ui+1;b > Ui;b: Now turn to sellers. Flexible sellers expect to earn
b = [1  z0 (qb)  z1 (qb)] rb + z1 (qb) y:
Basic algebra reveals that
b = 1  z0 (qb) 
NX
i=1
qi;bUi;b + z0 (qb)
NX
i=1
qi;b"i:
At xed price stores, things are the same as in the main text, i.e.
Uf =
1  z0 (qf )
qf
(1  rf ) and f = 1  z0 (qf )  qfUf :
Step 2. Case: "N = 0 (item 1 in the Proposition)
Consider xed price rms. Along our conjecture (to be veried later) types 1 through N shop at
at xed price rms, i.e. qi;f > 0 for all i = 1; ::N: Recall that all buyers earn the same expected
payo¤ at xed price rms, that is Ui;f = Uf for all i: The xed price rm solves
max
qf2R+
1  z0 (qf )  qfUf s.t. Uf = U;
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where U is the market utility o¤ered by the xed price rm. The FOC is given by U = z0 (qf ) ;
thus the rm earns
f = 1  z0 (qf )  z1 (qf ) :
Per our conjecture, exible rms attract type N only, i.e. qN;b > 0 and qi;b = 0 for i = 1; ::; N   1:
Substituting these into the expression for b yields
b = 1  z0 (qN;b)  qN;bUN;b:
The problem of a exible seller is given by
max
qN;b2R+
1  z0 (qN;b)  qN;bUN;b s.t. UN;b = UN ;
where UN is the market utility promised to type N customers. The FOC is given by UN = z0 (qN;b) ;
thus, the rm earns
b = 1  z0 (qN;b)  z1 (qN;b) :
In equilibrium, sellers must earn equal prots. The equality f = b yields qN;b = qf : Let '
denote the fraction of xed price rms and recall that i denotes the fraction of type i buyers. The
feasibility condition, analogous to the one in the main text requires
'qi;f + (1  ')qi;b = i for i = 1; :::; N
Noting that qi;b = 0 for i = 1::N   1, we have
qi;f =
i
'
; for i = 1; ::; N   1:
We know qf = qN;b: In addition, recall that qf =
PN
i=1 qi;f : Thus

'
N 1X
n=1
i + qN;f = qN;b )

'
(1  N ) + qN;f = qN;b:
For type N; we have
'qN;f + (1  ')qN;b = N:
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Substituting for qN;b from above
qN;f =

'
['  (1  N )] :
It follows that qN;b = qf = : Note that, the equilibrium value of '; denoted by ', is indeterminate
and can take any value within [1   N ; 1]; hence, there is a continuum of equilibria where an
indeterminate fraction '  1  N of sellers compete via xed pricing while the rest compete via
exible pricing. Notice, however, in any equilibrium, the total expected demand at each rm equals
to : Along this equilibria buyers and sellers earn
Uf = UN;b = z0 () and f = b = 1  z0 ()  z1 () :
The nal task is to verify the conjectures made above. First, the fact that Uf = UN;b = z0 () implies
that type N customers are indi¤erent between xed and exible stores; thus, as we conjectured,
they can shop at both types of stores. The second conjecture pertains types 1; ::; N   1 staying
away from exible stores. At xed price stores they earn Uf = z0 () : If they were to visit exible
stores, they would earn
Ui;b = UN;b   z0 () ("N   "i) ;
which is less than Uf because "N > "i and UN;b = Uf ; hence they are justied to stay way. This
completes the proof of item 1 in the proposition.
Step 3. Case: "N > 0 (item 2 in the Proposition)
Consider xed price rms. Along our conjecture (to be veried later) types 1 through N   1 shop
at at xed price rms, i.e. qi;f > 0 for all i = 1; ::N   1. Type N; on the other hand, stays away,
i.e. qN;f = 0; thus qf =
PN 1
i=1 qi;f : Recall that all buyers earn the same expected payo¤ at xed
price rms, that is Ui;f = Uf for all i = 1; ::; N   1: A xed price rm solves
max
qf2R+
1  z0 (qf )  qfUf s.t. Uf = U;
where U is the market utility of all types but type N: The FOC is given by U = z0 (qf ) ; thus the
rm earns
f = 1  z0 (qf )  z1 (qf ) :
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Per our conjecture, exible rms attract typeN only, i.e. qN;b > 0 whereas qi;b = 0 for i = 1; ::; N 1:
Substituting these equalities into the expression for b (and noting that "N > 0); a exible rms
expected prot becomes
b = 1  z0 (qN;b)  qN;bUN;b + z0 (qN;b) qN;b"N :
The exible seller solves
max
qN;b2R+
1  z0 (qN;b)  qN;bUN;b + z0 (qN;b) qN;b"N s.t. UN;b = UN ;
where UN is the market utility of type N customers. The FOC is given by
UN = z0 (qN;b) + [z0 (qN;b)  z1 (qN;b)] "N
thus, the rm earns
b = 1  z0 (qN;b)  z1 (qN;b) + qN;bz1 (qN;b) "N :
Let ' denote the fraction of xed price rms and recall that i denotes the fraction of type i buyers.
Feasibility requires
'qi;f + (1  ')qi;b = i for i = 1; :::; N:
Noting that qi;b = 0 for i = 1::N   1, we have
qi;f =
i
'
; for i = 1; ::; N   1 ) qf =
N 1X
i=1
qi;f =
1  N
'

In addition, since qN;f = 0 we have
qN;b =
N
1  ':
In equilibrium sellers must earn equal prots, i.e. (')  b f = 0: Note that b rises in qN;b;
which itself rises in ' and that f rises in qf ; which in turn falls in ': It follows that  rises in ':
In addition, note that (1  N ) > 0 since "N > 0 and that (0) < 0. The Intermediate Value
Theorem guarantees existence of a unique ' < 1  N such that (') = 0.
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Since ' < 1   N we have qN;b <  < qf : Solving UN;b = z0 (qN;b) + [z0 (qN;b)  z1 (qN;b)] "N
and Uf = z0 (qf ) for rf and rb yields equilibrium list prices:
rf = 1 
z1 (qf )
1  z0 (qf ) and r

b = 1 
z1 (qN;b) y   qN;bz1 (qN;b) "N
1  z0 (qN;b)  z1 (qN;b)
Observe that, as in the main text, the exible list price rb increases in "N ; which indicates that
exible sellers pass type Ns enthusiasm about getting a deal on to their prices (which explains
why lower types may want to stay away from a exible store).
To complete the proof, we need to verify the conjectures made earlier. First, we need to show
that, at the margin, type N buyers stay away from xed price stores. At exible rms they earn
UN;b = z0 (qN;b) + [z0 (qN;b)  z1 (qN;b)] "N :
At xed price rms they earn Uf = z0 (qf ) : The equal prot condition gives us
"N =
z0 (qN;b) + z1 (qN;b)  z0 (qf )  z1 (qf )
qN;bz1 (qN;b)
:
Our conjecture would hold if UN;b > Uf ; i.e. if
(1  qN;b) "N > z0 (qf )  z0 (qN;b)
z0 (qN;b)
:
Recall that qf > qN;b: Thus z0 (qf ) < z0 (qN;b) ; implying that the right hand side is negative. If
1  qN;b > 0 then we are done; so suppose that 1  qN;b < 0: The inequality holds if
"N <
z0 (qf )  z0 (qN;b)
z0 (qN;b) (1  qN;b) :
Substituting for " from above, we need
z0 (qN;b)
z0 (qf )
> q2N;b + 1  qN;b + qf   qfqN;b
We know qN;b < qf ; thus a su¢ cient condition is
z0 (qN;b)
z0 (qf )
> 1  qN;b + qf , eqf qN;b > 1  (qf   qN;b):
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Let x  qf   qN;b > 0: The question is whether ex+x 1 > 0: The expression on the left is positive
for all x > 0; hence the inequality holds. This veries the conjecture that type N buyers strictly
prefer to shop at exible stores.
The second conjecture pertains remaining types, i.e. we need to show that types 1; ::; N   1;
would not want to shop at exible stores. For that we need Uf > Ui;b: Recall that
Ui;b = UN;b   z0 (qN;b) ("N   "i) :
Thus, we need
Uf > UN;b   z0 (qN;b) ("N   "i) :
We already know that UN;b > Uf : Thus, for the above inequality to go through, the gap "N   "i
must be su¢ ciently large. Since "i rises in i; the gap is the smallest for type N   1 customers; so
pick i = N   1: In what follows we will show that if "N 1 is smaller than a threshold, which itself
is smaller than "N ; then the inequality holds. To start, recall that
UN;b = z0 (qN;b) + [z0 (qN;b)  z1 (qN;b)] "N and Uf = z0 (qf )
and keep in mind that qf > qN;b; so z0 (qf ) < z0 (qN;b) : The inequality holds if
z1 (qN;b) "N   z0 (qN;b) "N 1 > z0 (qN;b)  z0 (qf )
Note that: (i) if "N 1 = "N then the inequality is the other way around (from above) and (ii)
if "N 1 = 0 then the inequality holds (this step can be proved by substituting for "N and going
through the same steps as above). Thus, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists some
"N 1 2 (0; "N ), such that if "N 1 < "N 1 then the inequality holds. This veries the second
conjecture and completes the proof. 
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